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Abstract 
 
We investigate the role of U.S. analysts in facilitating home market information 
transmission for firms from 40 countries cross-listed in the U.S.. Recommendation 
revisions by U.S. analysts lead to significantly higher (lower) abnormal returns 
(volumes) in the home market compared to those by local analysts. This U.S.-location 
premium to information production cannot be explained by a bonding or certification 
role of U.S. analysts or differences in broker or analyst characteristics. Our results 
suggest that U.S. analysts facilitate U.S. investors’ access to foreign firms’ home 
markets and improve the information environment particularly in countries where the 
local analyst advantage is smaller. 
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1. Introduction 
Firms that cross-list in the U.S. tend to experience an increase in analyst following and 
usually have both U.S. and local analyst coverage after the cross-listing. Prior research has 
examined changes in analyst coverage and forecasts accuracy around cross-listing decisions 
(Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2003) and investigated the effect of the cross-listing on price and 
volume reactions to earnings announcements (Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva, 2006). Yet little is 
known about the role of informational intermediaries, such as analysts, located in the country 
of the cross-listing for the information environment of the firm and price discovery in the 
home market.1 For example, Karolyi (2006) observes that:  
“To fully understand the economic consequences of changes in the disclosure 
requirements for firms listing shares on overseas exchanges, research needs to concentrate 
more efforts on the role that informational intermediaries play.[…] Unfortunately, little is 
still known about the composition of the analysts, whether they are local or based in the new 
market, and whether this affects the dispersion or accuracy of their forecasts or the capital 
market participant’s reactions to their forecast skills” (p.114). 
Consequently, in this paper we examine the relative informativeness of U.S.-based 
analysts’ recommendation changes compared to local analysts’ for international stocks cross-
listed in the United States. In particular, we are interested in understanding how information 
produced by U.S. analysts affects trading in the home market of the cross-listed stock 
compared to information produced by local analysts.  
One strand of the literature shows that analysts’ stock recommendations generally tend 
to be informative (Womack, 1996; Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee, 2004), but that local 
analysts, and analysts that are geographically located closer to the firm, have an information 
advantage (Malloy, 2005; Bae, Stulz, and Tan, 2008). Another strand of the literature, 
                                                          
1
 A few studies examine changes in the information production by analysts for firms in countries that open their 
economies to foreign investors (Bae, Bailey and Mao, 2006) or that have foreign analyst followings (Bae, Stulz 
and Tan, 2008) by concentrating on forecasting characteristics. These studies do not investigate the implications 
for price discovery for cross-listed firms. 
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however, suggests that various monitoring mechanisms improve with a cross-listing and that 
overseas analysts might facilitate this “bonding” mechanism as well as play a certification 
role for the home stock (Karolyi, 2006; Stulz, 1999). Thus, U.S. analysts’ recommendations 
might be more informative than local analysts’ because information production might be more 
stringently regulated in the U.S. than in the local market, or because Wall Street 
intermediaries command a higher perceived reputation alleviating informational and agency 
concerns of home market investors. In addition, a cross-listing opens local firms to investors 
in the U.S., which increases the demand for the provision of analyst services for these stocks 
(Bae, Ozoguz, Tan and Wirjanto, 2012). If U.S. investors are more likely to follow U.S. 
analysts and also trade in the home market of the stock, home market prices might respond 
more strongly to information produced by U.S. analysts. 
We investigate stock return and trading volume reactions to analyst recommendation 
changes issued by local and foreign analysts for international stocks from 40 countries cross-
listed in the U.S from 2003-2007. We first examine home and U.S. market reactions to 
recommendation changes irrespective of the location of the issuing analyst. We find 
recommendation changes to be informative for both home and U.S. market investors, and find 
no significant differences in stock returns between the home and the U.S. market, but higher 
abnormal trading volumes in the home market. We next differentiate by the location of the 
analyst. Our main results show that recommendation changes by analysts based in the U.S. 
lead to significantly higher abnormal returns in both, the U.S. and the home market of the 
cross-listed firm, but that abnormal volumes are higher in the U.S. for recommendation 
changes from U.S. analysts and higher in the local market if issued by local analysts. We do 
not find such a differential effect for other foreign analysts. 
We examine price and volume reactions as they allow us to identify information 
asymmetries and differential information processing among investors (Kim and Verrecchia, 
1991, 1994). A price change at announcement of a recommendation change is proportional to 
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the news in the announcement and the precision of the announcement. A volume change is 
proportional to the absolute price change and differential private information across traders. 
Our findings of a higher U.S. and home market reaction to U.S. analyst recommendation 
changes compared to local analysts thus suggests that investors perceive the U.S. analysts’ 
signal to be of higher precision (holding the magnitude of the change constant). The relatively 
lower abnormal trading volumes in the home market to U.S. analysts’ recommendation 
changes suggest that there is less disagreement among investors about the precision of the 
U.S. signal compared to that of a local analyst. That is, the recommendation news of U.S. 
analysts is relatively more important to home market traders due to less precise private 
information and thus has a larger impact on their beliefs.    
We further find that the differential reaction to U.S. analyst recommendation changes is 
higher (and statistically more robust) for recommendation upgrades than downgrades. This 
result is consistent with the notion that agency costs might be higher for home market 
investors with respect to recommendation upgrades. If conflicts of interest are more pervasive 
between local analysts and local firms, which might mean that local analysts are more 
reluctant to issue downgrades or are more likely to issue upgrades for local firms, then 
investors will assign a higher U.S.-location premium to upgrades than downgrades.2 
Our results are robust to controls for firm, analyst, broker and recommendation 
characteristics as well as in within-firm-analyst estimations. We further strengthen 
identification by examining a subsample of analysts that move locations during our sample 
period and change from being a U.S-located analyst to become local analysts or vice versa 
(and move within the same or across brokerage firms). This empirical strategy allows us to 
isolate the effect of the location from unobserved differences in analyst, broker or firm 
                                                          
2
 Conflicts of interest could be more pervasive between local analysts and local firms if the local broker is more 
dependent on other business relationships with the firm compared to an international broker that has more 
diversified client relationships. 
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characteristics. The differential market reaction to the U.S.-location of the analyst persists 
within this subsample.  
We further investigate the source of the U.S.-analyst premium. One possibility is that 
U.S.-located analysts have an information timing advantage and on average issue 
recommendation changes earlier than local analysts. However, we do not find any significant 
differences in the timing of the recommendation changes between U.S. and local analysts. 
That is, U.S. and local analysts are equally as likely to be leaders as followers in making a 
recommendation change for a particular firm. We also do not find evidence that the results are 
due to different skill-sets of U.S. and local analysts. 
We then investigate whether the U.S.-analyst premium stems from a bonding or 
certification mechanism. Capital-markets-based accounting research has long emphasized 
changes in reporting and disclosure requirements that come with a cross-listing as first order 
effects on the valuation of the firm. Cross-listings are seen as strategic tools by managers, 
who cannot credibly convey material information about the future prospects of the firm to 
shareholders, by helping them mitigate information and agency problems if the overseas 
market they cross-list on has higher disclosure and governance requirements (Karolyi, 2006). 
A cross-listing might thus be a credible way for a firm in a country with weak investor 
protection to commit to higher-quality governance by borrowing the investor protection of the 
country of the cross-listing (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2007) and by exposing itself to 
stronger monitoring that is otherwise unavailable in the home market (Coffee, 1999, 2002). In 
addition to the stronger legal, governance and disclosure environment, Stulz (1999) highlights 
the role of “reputational intermediaries” such as securities analysts that may serve as a 
certification mechanism for the quality of the firm.  
If the bonding hypothesis explains the U.S.-location premium for analyst 
recommendations, we expect to find the results to be stronger for firms that cross-list from 
countries with weak legal, governance or disclosure environments. We use various proxies 
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that differentiate between the legal, governance and disclosure environments of the home 
countries. We find the opposite. The higher responsiveness to U.S. analysts could also be 
attributed a signalling role of intermediaries that lend their reputation to the cross-listing firm 
by marketing the firm to host country investors (Stulz, 1999). However, despite finding that 
U.S. analysts are more likely to work for more reputable brokers, we do not find any evidence 
that these differences in reputation are incrementally informative. 
Instead, the findings that the U.S.-location premium for analyst recommendations is 
stronger for firms from more developed countries seems consistent with a U.S. investor 
demand effect. As U.S. investors are more likely to invest in countries that have a larger share 
in the world portfolio, i.e. developed countries (Bae, Bailey, and Mao, 2006), there is a larger 
demand for U.S. analysts covering firms in those countries resulting in more resources being 
devoted to information production for these firms. Thus, more U.S. analyst resources are used 
to produce better information, which leads to more responsive stock returns.3   
Our study is the first to investigate the role of intermediaries in improving the 
information environment of cross-listed stocks. A large literature in finance examines the 
economic consequences of cross-listings and argues that firms located in countries with weak 
legal protection and governance mechanisms can benefit from the stronger legal and 
governance environment of overseas markets through cross-listings (Reese and Weisbach, 
2002; Doidge, 2004; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004). The benefits in the form of lower 
information asymmetries and agency costs are suggested to arise by committing the firm to 
higher legal and regulatory standards and stronger enforcement of the overseas listing (Coffee 
1999, 2002). Several studies also find an increase in institutional ownership in cross-listed 
firms as additional monitoring device (Edison and Warnock, 2004; Bradshaw, Bushee, and 
Miller, 2004). In addition, cross-listings are found to be associated with improvements in the 
                                                          
3
 In robustness test, we find suggestive evidence pointing in this direction. This interpretation of our results is 
also consistent with the findings in Bae, Stulz, Tan (2008) of a weaker local analyst advantage for stocks in 
countries with better disclosure environments and confirm, for cross-listed stocks, that the openness of countries 
to foreign investors is correlated with a better information environment and more responsive stock returns (Bae, 
Bailey and Mao, 2006; Bae, Ozoguz, Tan, and Wirjanto, 2012).    
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information and trading environment of the firm (Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver, 2002; Lang, 
Lins, and Miller, 2003; Karolyi, 2004; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008). Baker, Nofsinger, and 
Weaver (2002), for example, find that non-U.S. firms that cross-list in the U.S. experience an 
increase in the number of analysts that follow the stock. Similarly, Lang, Lins, and Miller 
(2003) find increased analyst coverage and higher forecast accuracy for cross-listed firms.  
We contribute to this strand of the literature by showing that intermediaries play an 
important role in producing the benefits of an improved information environment. In 
particular, we add to the literature that finds that cross-listings are associated with the benefits 
of a larger shareholder base and improved information transmission (Foerster and Karolyi, 
1999; Bae, Ozguz, Tan, and Wirjanto, 2012) by finding that information intermediaries in the 
country of the cross-listing facilitate trading in the home market. 
Another strand of the literature in finance and accounting investigates the market 
reaction to analyst recommendation changes and generally finds these to be informative 
(Womack, 1996; Jegadeesh, Kim, Kirsche, and Lee, 2004; Yezegel, 2015). Several studies 
show, however, that geographical distance has a negative effect on the accuracy of analyst 
earnings forecasts suggesting that local analysts have an information advantage (Malloy, 
2005; Bae, Stulz, and Tan, 2008). We contribute to this literature by finding that, despite the 
documented local analyst advantage, U.S. analyst recommendation changes command higher 
information value for the home market trading of cross-listed stocks, which we suggest stems 
from U.S. investor demand consistent with the literature on financial liberalization (e.g., Bae, 
Bailey, and Mao, 2006; Bae, Ozguz, Tan, and Wirjanto, 2012). As such our study is also 
related to the literature that examines return co-movements and trading volumes in 
international stock markets (Halling, Pagano, Randl, and Zechner, 2008; Gagnon and Karolyi, 
2009; Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010). We find that differential home-US return and volume 
reactions for cross-listed stocks stem from location differences of the information source (i.e., 
the analyst recommendation change). 
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2. Data and Methodology 
2.1. Sample Selection 
We obtain data on foreign stocks listed on the three major United States exchanges 
(NYSE, NASDAQ, Amex) between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2007 from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream.4 We only consider depositary receipts (Level II and Level III ADRs) and 
direct (ordinary) listings. We exclude from the initial sample Level I ADRs, Rule 144A 
ADRs, Reg. S shares and stock denoted as preferred shares, trust units or right issues.5 In 
order to identify the final group of Home-U.S. stocks pairs we apply several criteria.  
First, we match the parent stock (i.e., the home counterpart) to every ADR recorded in 
Datastream.6 We then retrieve the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) 
numbers of the ADR and the underlying stock, and compare manually the codes and names 
with the main depositary banks’ directories from Bank of New York Mellon, Citibank, 
Deutsche Bank and J.P. Morgan.7,8  
For foreign firms that list in the form of ordinary programs we follow a similar 
procedure. We identify in Datastream all foreign firms (i.e., firms with a DS item market 
different from United States) listed as secondary quote on the NYSE, NASDAQ or Amex and 
obtain the ISIN codes of the home counterpart.  We further identify the country of origin of 
                                                          
 
 
4
 Our sample period ends in 2007 since Nelson Publishing Inc. stopped producing its Directory of Investment 
Research that provides locations of brokers and financial analysts in 2008.  
5 We focus on listed ADR programs (Level II and Level III ADRs) and direct listings and exclude unlisted 
programs (Level 1 and Rule 144 ADRs) as price and volume reactions of the latter might be affected by 
differences in liquidity and market microstructure as Level I ADRs are traded over-the-counter (OTC) and Rule 
144 ADRs through Automated Linkages (PORTAL). Moreover, there are large differences in the information 
environment between the listed and OTC programme in terms of governance, disclosure and reporting standard 
requirements. 
6 We use a combination of various Worldscope and Datastream items (WC06116 ADR non-US identifier 
security, QTEALL and QTDALL) as well as manual matching to identify the primary (home stock) and secondary 
quotes (U.S. ADR or ordinary share) of each pair. 
7 Bank of New York Mellon DR Directory (http://www.adrbnymellon.com/dr_directory.jsp), Citi Bank Global 
DR Directory (https://depositaryreceipts.citi.com/adr/guides/uig.aspx?pageId=8&subpageID=34),  
Deutsche Bank DR Universe (https://www.adr.db.com/drweb/dr_universe_type_e.html), J.P. Morgan DR 
Universe (https://www.adr.com/Investors/Markets). 
8
 Stock Exchange Daily Official List (SEDOL) numbers for the underlying stocks are also used. When the ISIN 
code of the ADR is missing in the Depositary Banks directories we use CUSIP number, convert it to its 
equivalent ISIN number and check it with the Datastream ADR’s ISIN.  
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the underlying stock and the local exchange market where the foreign stock is traded. We use 
the Citibank Global DR Directory, the Bank of New York Mellon Terminated DRs Directory 
and SEC 20-F fillings to ascertain the exact dates of the cross-listings on and delistings from 
the major markets.9 Finally, we validate our pair-observations by cross-checking the name, 
country and U.S. exchange of cross-listed firms with the annual list of foreign companies 
registered with the SEC for each year from 2003 to 2007.10  
In our sample we consider only pairs with daily closing price, stock returns, number of 
shares traded and number of shares outstanding available in Datastream for both the U.S. 
cross-listing and its local counterpart.11  We exclude stocks with missing market data in one 
of the two markets and single-listed foreign firms (i.e., firms that only list on the U.S. 
exchange but not in their home country).  
Datastream local market indices are used for each local stock listing as proxy for the 
national market portfolio. Effective issue and termination dates from the depositaries banks’ 
directories and the Datastream items BASE and TIME are used to restrict our analysis just for 
the time period during which firms are listed simultaneously in the two markets (Home and 
U.S.). When an ADR or an ordinary program terminates, the local stock delists, or the ADR is 
downgraded to OTC we set the observations subsequently to missing values for both the U.S. 
and home series.12 
                                                          
9
 Although Datastream maintains a record of inactive stocks, only the most recent status and exchange listing is 
kept, which could potentially lead to a misidentification for some stocks that are recorded as listed on one of the 
major U.S. exchanges, but are in fact upgrades from past over-the-counter Level 1 ADRs or Rule 144a listings 
during our sample period. Similarly stocks recorded as listed on OTC markets might have previously traded on 
the NYSE, Nasdaq or Amex at some point during our sample period. For example, German BASF SE (formerly 
BASF AG) was listed as ADR on the NYSE for seven years until September 5, 2007. The firm was then 
downgraded and continues to trade as OTC. Because the stock is still active as of June 2016, Datastream 
identifies its exchange market as OTC also for the pre-2007 period. We cross-check Datastream and the merged 
dataset of depositary banks to identify this issue. 
10
 https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml. 
11 Market data are obtained from Datastream using the adjusted unpadded option. 
12 Consider the case of Allied Domecq Plc, a UK firm cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The stock 
was upgraded from OTC to NYSE on July 31, 2002 and delisted on July 27, 2005 from London and New York 
after a takeover by Pernod-Ricard SA. The firm is therefore present in our sample only between the two dates 
(upgrade and delisting). 
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The sample of Home-U.S. pairs is further restricted to firms with analyst 
recommendations data in the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and firms with a 
valid I/B/E/S ticker for the ADR/ordinary shares or for the home country stock.13 We remove 
duplicates and eliminate observations with anonymous analysts (I/B/E/S analyst code 
amaskcd equal to 0). These screens leave us with 550 cross-listed firms from 40 countries 
with 31,988 recommendation changes/reiterations issued by 4,783 analysts.  
2.2. Analyst Location 
For the above sample we identify the location of analysts and brokers. We include 
recommendations in our sample only if the geographical locations of the financial analysts 
and brokerage firms for which they work can be unambiguously determined. Using the 
I/B/E/S analyst code and the year of the recommendation issued by the analyst, we compare 
the name of the analyst in I/B/E/S with the information contained in the annual volumes of 
Nelson’s Directories of Investment Research (2004-2008).14 Each edition of Nelson’s 
Directory published in year t uses analyst data (name, office address) as of November of the 
previous year. The country location of analysts and brokers in year t is then obtained from the 
year t+1 edition of Nelson’s Directory.15 We identify the geographical location (country and 
city) for 3,869 financial analysts (81% of the total) located in 44 different countries working 
for 422 brokers issuing a total of 28,453 recommendation changes/reiterations (89% of the 
total). 
Finally, we classify each analyst and brokerage firm as local or foreign by comparing 
their geographical location with that of the cross-listed firm following Bae, Stulz, and Tan 
                                                          
13
 As we obtained data on analysts’ recommendations and earnings forecasts from two different vintages of 
I/B/E/S in 2011 and 2013, our data should not be affected by the biases documented by Ljungqvist, Malloy and 
Marston (2009) across seven different I/B/E/S downloads obtained between 2000 and 2007. Since then I/B/E/S 
reported that the files have been purged from the main biases (e.g., alterations, deletions, additions and 
anonymizations of analysts and/or firms covered). 
14
 We exclude I/B/E/S/ analyst codes that identify a team or group of analysts and concentrate our analysis on 
individual analysts. 
15 We thank Hongping Tan for kindly providing us his data on analyst and broker geographical locations. For a 
more detailed explanation on the matching procedure between the analysts data from I/B/E/S and Nelson’s 
Directories see, among others, Malloy (2005), Bae, Tan, and Welker (2008) and O’Brien and Tan (2015). 
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(2008). If the analyst is located in same country as the firm she covers, the analyst is 
identified as Local. By contrast if the analyst is located in a different country from the covered 
firm, the analyst is classified as Foreign. We use the same approach for brokerage firms. A 
broker is identified as Local if its headquarter is located is the same country as the cross-listed 
firm and Foreign otherwise. This specification allows us to identify if the analyst works at the 
broker’s headquarters or in one of the subsidiaries abroad.  
The broker location allows us to further classify a local analyst as Pure Local if she is 
employed by a local broker (i.e., headquartered in the same country as the covered firm) or as 
Expatriate Local (i.e., the local analyst works for a foreign broker). We also divide the foreign 
analyst group into Foreign_SR and Foreign_DR for foreign analysts located in the same or in 
a different geographical region from the firm they cover, respectively. Analysts located in the 
United States (US_Located) are by definition foreign analysts and can belong to the 
Foreign_SD or Foreign_DR category. We provide detailed summary statistics for the 
complete sample of cross-listed firms, analyst locations and recommendations in the next two 
sub-sections 
2.3. Summary Statistics 
The distribution of our sample firms across countries, industries, and analyst locations is 
presented in Table 1. Panel A of the table shows that Canada has the largest number of cross-
listed firms (196), followed by the United Kingdom (57), Brazil (36), Japan (26), France and 
Mexico (21). The smallest number of cross-listed firms belongs to Austria, Belgium, 
Colombia, Hungary, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, and Turkey with only 1 firm per country with 
non-missing observations.  
Local analysts issued 16,480 recommendations changes or reiterations and foreign 
analysts 11,973. The largest number of rating changes/reiterations is provided by pure-local 
analysts (10,895) followed by foreign analysts located in the same geographical region of the 
covered firms (8,286), expatriate local analysts (5,585) and foreign analysts in a different 
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geographical region (3,687). US_Located analysts account for 4,157 recommendation changes 
and reiterations.  
In the far right column of the table we report the respective number of analysts covering 
the cross-listed firms of a specific country of origin. The total number of analyst observations 
is 3,876 located in 44 countries. The sum of analysts following firms as pure local, expatriate 
local, and foreign (in the same or a different region) does not equal to the total number of 
analysts since a given analyst can follow more than one firm in more than one country and/or 
sector and can change location in a given year.  
Canadian firms have the highest number of recommendations changes/reiterations in 
our sample (8,068) and the largest number of analysts observations (911) followed by firms 
from the United Kingdom (734), France (448), the Netherlands (366), and Germany (355). 
Firms in these countries also have a higher number of foreign analysts following than local 
analysts. 
Panel B shows that on average our sample covers 436 cross-listed firms in the U.S. per 
year from 2003 to 2007 with a similar fairly equally distributed number of analysts and 
recommendation changes/reiterations over the sample years. The far right column in the Panel 
shows that out of the 550 firms in our sample, more than 300 are present in all the years of our 
sample period. 
2.4. Recommendation Statistics 
Table 2 reports the number of recommendation changes and the magnitude of the 
change compared to the previous recommendation of the same analyst. I/B/E/S converts the 
recommendations of analysts to a standardized numerical five-point coding. We adopt the 
convention and reverse the score such that 5 = strong buy, 4 = buy, 3 = hold, 2 = 
underperform, 1 = sell. We compute recommendations changes/reiterations by comparing the 
current rating with the prior rating issued by the same analyst.  
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Rating changes that lie above the main diagonal (reiterations) are downgrades and 
ratings below the main diagonal are upgrades. Upgrades, downgrades and unchanged ratings 
account for 37%, 39% and 24% of the total 28,457 rating changes, respectively. The main 
ratings-change categories are downgrades from buy-to-hold (4,539 or 16% of the total), 
upgrades from hold-to-buy (4,252 or 15%), reiterations of prior hold (3,051 or 11%) and of 
prior buy (2,382 or 8%) and downgrades from hold-to-underperform (1,901 or 7%).16  
Figure 1 summarizes the relative frequencies of rating changes conditional on prior 
recommendations. The Figure shows that a movement towards or from a subsequent hold 
rating represents nearly 50% of all the cases and that a prior hold rating on average gets 
upgraded to a buy with a 37.08% probability.  
2.5. Methodology 
We use a standard event-study methodology to calculate the average cumulative 
abnormal returns around a three-day event window [-1; +1] centred around the 
recommendation change/reiteration, both for the home and US market. For each cross-
listed firm, we estimate excess returns using the market model of the respective market: 
tm
H
iiti
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H RRAR ,)(,)(,)( ˆˆ βα −−=  (1) 
tm
US
jjtj
US
tjUS RRAR ,)(,)(,)( ˆˆ βα −−=  (2)            
ti
HAR ,)(  and tjUSAR ,)(  are stock i’s and US counterpart j’s (ADR or ordinary 
share) daily excess returns at time t; tiHR ,)(  and tjUSR ,)(  are stock i’s and US counterpart 
j’s (ADR or ordinary share) daily returns at time t; tmHR ,)(  and tmUSR ,)( are the stock i’s 
corresponding Thomson Reuters Datastream (TRD) national stock market index (Datastream 
item TOTMK[country_code]) and the US counterpart j’s corresponding TRD US stock market 
index (Datastream item TOTMKUS) daily returns at time t. 17 
                                                          
16 In untabulated results, we find that the proportions of upgrades, downgrades, and reiterations are similar across 
different analyst locations.  
17
 See Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti (2010). The model parameters α and β are estimated over daily times-series 
OLS regressions on domestic and US market models using a [-121,-2] estimation window given by R(H) i,t, = αi, + 
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For each cross-listed firm, daily abnormal returns (AR(H)i,t and AR(US)j,t) are cumulated 
from day t to day τ and mean domestic and foreign cumulative abnormal returns for a [t, τ] 
event window are then obtained by averaging the domestic and foreign cumulative abnormal 
returns corresponding to each recommendation change/reiteration category and analyst 
location. 
Daily trading volumes are computed as ln[1 + n(H)i,t ] / ln[1+ S(H)i,t ] and ln[1 + n(US)j,t ] / 
ln[1+ S(US)j,t ], where n(H)i,t and n(US)j,t are the daily number of shares traded (Datastream item 
VO) for stock i and US counterpart j (ADR or ordinary share), respectively. Similarly S(H)i,t 
and S(US)j,t are the daily total number of shares outstanding (Datastream item NOSH) for stock 
i and US counterpart j. Abnormal trading volumes ( )(
,
H
t iAV  and 
)(
,
US
t jAV ) are calculated as 
the difference between the trading volumes of the stock i or the US counterpart j at time 
t ( )(
,
H
t iV  and 
)(
,
US
t jV ) and the average volume ( )(,Ht iV  and )(,USt jV ) over a [-61, -2] and [+2, 
+61] estimation window (Womack, 1996):18 
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Daily abnormal volumes (AV(H)i,t and AV(US)j,t) are aggregated for each cross-listed 
firm from day -1 to day +1. We then average the domestic and foreign cumulative 
abnormal volumes analogous to abnormal returns to obtain mean domestic and foreign 
cumulative abnormal volumes over a [-1, +1] event window. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
βi R(H)m,t + εi,t  and R(US) j,t, = αj, + βj R(US) m,t + εj,t. Daily log-returns between day t and day t-1 are computed using 
the stock or market cum-dividend total return index (Datastream item RI) in local currency and in US dollars for 
stock i and US counterpart (ADR or ordinary share) j, respectively. We restrict our analysis to recommendations 
changes/reiterations events with sufficient daily return observations for the estimation window. We consider an 
event before June 18, 2003 only if the firm remains listed in the same markets in the previous 121 trading days. 
If the recommendation is issued on Saturday or Sunday we consider the first subsequent Monday as day 0 in the 
event window. 
18
 We first apply a logarithmic transformation of volumes as suggested by Ajinkya and Jain (1989) such that 
V(H)i,t = ln(1+ Vol(H)i,t ) and V(US)i,t = ln(1+ Vol(US)i,t ), where Vol(H)i,t and Vol(US) j,t  are stock i’s and US counterpart 
j’s (ADR or ordinary share) daily trading volumes. 
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3. Univariate Comparisons 
3.1. Analysts’ recommendation changes in US and home markets 
Table 3 presents results on abnormal returns and volumes in home and US markets 
conditional on the magnitude of the recommendation change. Table 3 does not distinguish by 
location of the analyst. The results in the table show that recommendation changes generate 
significant excess returns both in the home and U.S. markets. Home (U.S.) mean market 
reactions following upgrades and downgrades are 1.07% (1.06%) and -1.65% (-1.68%), 
respectively, and statistically significant at 1%-level. This initial evidence confirms that––
consistent with the prior literature––recommendations changes are informative and that 
downgrades convey a stronger signal to markets (e.g., Womack, 1996).  
The table further shows that ratings changes on average elicit similar market responses 
in the home and U.S. markets. The mean and median differences between the 3-day 
cumulative abnormal returns in the home and U.S. markets are not statistically different from 
zero (Columns 5 and 6). These results hold for any magnitude of the ratings change as well as 
on average across upgrades and downgrades. The evidence is consistent with the law of one 
price.  
The right hand-side columns in Table 3 further show abnormal trading volumes around 
the recommendation changes/reiterations. Analysts’ recommendation changes not only 
generate significant prices reactions but also induce greater-than-average trading volumes 
both in the home and U.S. markets confirming their informativeness. 
However, while there are no significant differences in the cumulative abnormal returns 
between the home and U.S. markets, upgrades and downgrades exhibit higher excess trading 
volumes in the home market than in the U.S. market. The mean (median) differences for 
upgrades and downgrades are both statistically different from zero at 1.33% (2.28%) and 
1.13% (2.53%), respectively. These results hold across most of the recommendation change 
categories, but in particular for 2-point and 1-point recommendations changes.  
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Overall, these initial results are consistent with the hypothesis that rating changes are 
equally informative in the local and U.S. market, but also show that on average, excess 
trading activity is more intense in the home than in the U.S. market suggesting that there 
exists more disagreement or less prior information among investors in the home market. 
3.2. The effect of analysts’ locations 
Table 4 reports CARs and CAVs in the home and U.S. market by geographical location 
of the analyst. The table also shows results whether differences in cumulative abnormal 
returns and volumes generated by the recommendation changes are associated with analyst 
locations. Results are presented separately for upgrades (Panel A) and downgrades (Panel B). 
We divide the Local group into Pure Local and Expatriate Local analysts, the Foreign group 
in Foreign_SR and Foreign_DR analysts and isolate the group of foreign U.S.-Located 
analysts.  
Consistent with the previous results, Panel A reveals that recommendation changes are 
associated with statistically significant CARs and CAVs in the home and U.S. market 
irrespective of the analyst location. While mean CARs are not different between home and 
U.S. markets across the analyst location categories (Column 5), home market CAVs are 
higher when upgrades are issued by local analysts (and foreign analysts that are located in the 
same region) and U.S. market CAVs are higher when upgrades are issued by U.S.-Located 
and Foreign_DR analysts (Columns 11 and 12). More specifically, upgrades issued by Local 
analysts exhibit mean (median) differences in CAVs of 2.14% (2.82%) while differences in 
mean (median) CAVs for recommendation changes by U.S.-Located analysts are negative and 
equal to -3.66% (-0.93%).  
More interestingly, however, significant differences exist between the market reactions 
within the home and U.S. markets subject to analyst locations. Panel A shows that upgrades 
by analysts located in the United States generate mean cumulative abnormal returns of 1.89% 
and 1.95% in the home and U.S. market, respectively. Upgrades issued by Local analysts 
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generate a lower market reaction and the mean home (U.S.) CARs amount to 1.06% (1.03%). 
That is, we find that U.S.-Located analysts are more informative than Local analysts even in 
the home market. The differences (local – U.S.-located) are statistically and economically 
significant in the home (U.S. market) at -0.83% (-0.92%) at the 1%-level (lower panel in 
Panel A). The pattern is similar when we disaggregate the Local analysts into Pure Local and 
Expatriate Local. Excess returns range from 1.04% to 1.09% in the home market and from 
0.99% to 1.11% in the U.S. market and both are significantly smaller than reactions to U.S.-
Located analysts.  
A similar pattern persists when we examine downgrades (Panel B of table 4). Again, the 
results support the notion of a higher information value of analysts located in the United 
States even for home market trading. The three-day mean cumulative abnormal returns to 
U.S. analyst downgrades are equal to -2.51% and -2.59% in the home and U.S. market, 
respectively. Local analysts instead generate mean home (U.S.) CARs of -1.65% (-1.63%). 
The differences in market reactions are statistically significant and similar in economic 
magnitude to upgrades (second panel in Panel B).  
The results on CAVs are equally similar to the pattern observed for upgrades. 
Downgrades issued by Local analysts exhibit mean (median) differences in CAVs equal to 
1.67% (2.51%) and differences in mean (median) CAVs to downgrades issued by U.S.-
Located analysts are negative and equal to -2.42% (-0.21%).  
Overall, we find that U.S.-Located analyst upgrades are more informative than Local 
analyst upgrades in the Home and US market and similarly U.S.-Located analyst downgrades 
are more informative than Local analyst downgrades. We also find incremental excess trading 
in the home market in response to Local analysts’ recommendation changes and in the U.S. 
market in response to U.S.-Located analysts’. 
 
4. Cross-Sectional Regressions 
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4.1. The informativeness of US analyst recommendation changes 
The preliminary results in Table 4 highlight statistically and economically significant 
differences in the cumulative excess returns (and somewhat weaker in excess volumes) 
between Local (Pure Local and Expatriate Local) and U.S.-Located analysts. The results 
suggest that an U.S.-Located analyst’s recommendation change has incremental information 
value for the home market stock compared to a recommendation change by a local analyst 
based in the home country of the stock.19  
We run pooled cross-sectional regressions, using announcement CARs (-1, +1) as 
dependent variables, on our main variable of interest Local (Pure Local, Expatriate Local) vs 
U.S.-Located, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the recommendation 
change is issued by a Local (Pure Local, Expatriate Local) analyst and 0 if issued by an U.S.-
Located analyst. The model is estimated as follows:  
CAR[-1,+1],i =  αi + β1 Local vs U.S.-Located + ∑ βk Controls + εi    (5) 
We control for a set of variables related to analyst, broker, recommendation and firm 
characteristics based on findings in the prior literature and for various fixed effects (omitted in 
the equation, but stated at the bottom of Table 5), cluster standard errors by analyst and run 
the regression separately for upgrades and downgrades. The results are presented in Table 5. 
 We control for the analyst’s experience measured as the number of years since the 
analyst first appeared in the I/B/E/S database (Analyst General Experience) and the difference 
of the number of years the analyst has covered the firm compared to all other analysts that 
covered the firm (Analyst Firm Experience), the number of firms the analyst follows (Number 
                                                          
19
 The results in Tables 3 and 4 also highlight that there are no statistically significant differences in the CARs (-
1,+1) between the home and U.S. market. We therefore restrict all subsequent analyses to the domestic (home) 
market with control variables related to the domestic stock. Untabulated results further reveal that the differences 
in returns are partly affected by time-zone differences and synchronicity in trading hours. We control for these 
effects in the cross-sectional tests in this section using fixed-effects.  
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Firms Followed), as well as the size (Broker Size) and reputation (Broker Reputation) of the 
broker.20 
We further control for the potential confounding effects of firm and earnings news 
highlighted by the prior literature (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2009; Li, Ramesh, Shen, and Wu, 
2015). Pre (Post)-Earnings are dummy variables equal to one if the recommendation change 
is issued in the two weeks before (after) an earnings announcement. Concurrent Earnings 
Forecast is equal to one if the recommending analyst issued an EPS revision for the stock in 
the three-day window around the recommendation change and the estimate was revised in the 
same direction as the recommendation change.21 
Stickel (1995) notes that downgrades that skip one category change generate, at least in 
the short term, a significantly higher market reaction. The results in Table 3 confirm that 2, 3 
and 4-point changes generate higher cumulative abnormal returns than 1-point category 
change and that the results are stronger for downgrades compared to upgrades. It is 
conceivable that US-located analysts are significantly more likely to issue recommendation 
changes by more than one point compared to local analysts contributing to the higher 
magnitude in the market reaction.22 We therefore control for the magnitude of the 
recommendation change (Abs. Recommendation Change).23  
To control for firm-characteristics we add the following variables: Size is the domestic 
market capitalization (Datastream item MV) computed as the domestic share price 
                                                          
20
 We use the complete universe of  recommendations present in I/B/E/S from 1993 to 2007 in order to compute 
the broker/analysts control variables. The final dataset contains 1,367,928 observations for firms listed in 68 
countries. 
21
 We retrieve data on individual analyst's one-year ahead earnings per share (EPS) estimate from I/B/E/S by 
using the U.S. and International Detail Earnings Estimate History. We adopt the same selection criteria as with 
the recommendations in defining the sample of EPS estimate revisions/reiterations. For the final sample of 550 
cross-listed firms we merge the information drawn from the two I/B/E/S Detail Earnings Estimate files and 
identify a sample of 128,507 forecast revisions and reiterations of prior forecasts. EPS estimate 
revisions/reiterations are defined as the current estimate for one-year-ahead EPS minus the prior estimate by the 
same analyst. 
22
 In fact, an untabulated t-test reveals that the mean absolute recommendation change of US-located analysts is 
significantly lower than that of local analysts at the 0.01%-level (t = -6.70). 
23
 For example, going from a hold (=3) to a buy (=4) the variable would have a value of one, going from hold 
(=3) to sell (=1) the variable would have a value of 2, an unchanged rating would have a value of zero, and so 
on. 
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(Datastream item P) times the domestic total number of shares outstanding (Datastream item 
NOSH) as of the end of June in the year prior to the recommendation change/reiteration 
(converted in millions of U.S. dollar); Book-to-Market, is computed as the book value of 
equity (Worldscope item WC03501) for the year ended before June 30, divided by market 
capitalization (Worldscope item WC08001) on December 31st of the same fiscal year. 
Turnover, is the domestic average daily trading volume calculated as the number of domestic 
shares traded (Datastream item VO) scaled by the domestic number of shares outstanding 
(Datastream item NOSH) over the 63 days prior to the recommendation change; Prev1M  is 
the domestic stock return over the 21 trading days prior to the recommendation 
change/reiteration; Prev1Y is the domestic stock return over the prior 252 trading days prior to 
the recommendation change, excluding the 21 trading days prior to the recommendation 
change; Analyst Coverage is the total number of analysts covering the firm in the year of the 
recommendation change.  
Columns (1) to (6) in Table 5 show the results for upgrades. Consistent with Table 4, 
we find that upgrades from U.S.-Located analysts outperform upgrades by Local, Pure Local 
and Expatriate Local analysts by a statistically and economically significant 0.82%, 0.94% 
and 0.90% (Columns 1-3) over the three day announcement window, respectively.24 Column 
(4) repeats the main regression with year, and firm fixed effects; column (5) shows results 
with year, firm and analyst fixed effects, and column (6) with year and firm-analyst pair fixed 
effects. In all three regressions the market reaction to U.S.-Located analyst recommendation 
upgrades remains economically significantly higher (0.50%, 2.06% and 2.72%, respectively) 
than to Local analyst recommendation upgrades, controlling for observed firm, broker, 
analyst, and recommendation characteristics and unobserved (constant) firm, analyst and 
firm-analyst pair heterogeneity. The results in Column 6 suggest that within the same firm-
                                                          
24
 A Chi-square test (untabulated) reveals that the coefficients on the Pure Local and Expatriate Local dummies 
are not significantly different from each other (Chi2=1.09, p=0.30). 
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analyst pairing recommendation upgrades by U.S.-Located analysts result in an economically 
significant 2.72% higher market reaction than recommendation upgrades by local analysts. 
Columns (7) to (12) show the results for downgrades. Again, consistent with Table 4, 
we find that downgrades from U.S.-Located analysts elicit higher (in magnitude) market 
reactions than downgrades by Local, Pure Local and Expatriate Local analysts by a 
statistically and economically significant 1.10%, 1.07% and 1.37% (Columns 7-9), 
respectively.25 Similar to upgrades Column (10)-(12) report results of the main regression 
with year and firm fixed effects, year, firm and analyst fixed effects and year and firm-analyst 
pair fixed effects. In column (10) the market reaction to U.S.-Located analyst 
recommendation downgrades is weakly significantly lower by 0.40% than to Local analyst 
recommendation downgrades. The coefficients are not statistically significant in Columns 
(11) and (12).26 
Overall, the results in Table 5 confirm that recommendation changes by U.S.-Located 
analysts are more informative for home market investors than recommendation changes by 
local analysts. These findings are economically and statistically significant for upgrades and 
robust to the inclusion of various observable firm, analyst and broker characteristics as well as 
fixed effects, but weaker for downgrades.  
4.2. Do unobserved analyst and broker characteristics explain the results? 
Despite the inclusion of various analyst and broker characteristics and estimation within 
analyst-firm pairings in Table 5 it is possible that the results are due to unobserved analyst 
and broker characteristics that change over time that influence the perceived value of US-
                                                          
25
 A Chi-square test (untabulated) reveals that the coefficients on the Pure Local and Expatriate Local dummies 
are significantly different from each other (Chi2=2.92, p=0.09). 
26
 We re-run the regressions for upgrades and downgrades for each recommendation change category (1-4) 
separately. The results remain unchanged for the first two categories 1 and 2, but are statistically insignificant for 
categories 4 (for upgrades) and 3 and 4 (for downgrades) possibly because of the lower power due to only little 
more than 100 observations for each of these categories.  
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located analyst recommendation changes relative to their local counterparts.27 We therefore 
next examine the informativeness of recommendation changes within a sub-sample of 
analysts that move from the home market of the firm to the US or from the US to the home 
market of the firm they cover, i.e., the Local vs U.S.-Located dummy variable switches from 0 
to 1 or from 1 to 0 within the subsample of analyst movers. We identify 74 analysts that move 
to and from the U.S. at least once during our sample period. 
Table 6, Panel A presents the results. The coefficient on Local vs U.S.-Located remains 
statistically significant for the subsample of upgrades with and without the inclusion of 
different fixed effects, but is insignificant for the subsample of downgrades confirming the 
preliminary results of Table 5. The results suggest that an upgrade from the same analyst for 
the same firm leads to an almost 2.5% higher market reaction when the analyst issues the 
upgrade when based in the US compared to when based in the home country of the firm 
(Table 6 Panel A, column 4).  
The preceding analysis does not distinguish between whether the analyst is moving to 
another broker when moving location. We investigate whether the results are sensitive to 
moves within or across brokers by further dividing the subsample of moving analysts into 
those that at the same time of the location also move to another broker and those that stay 
with the same broker and only change their office location. Focusing the analysis on this 
subsample allows us to hold analyst (and broker) characteristics fixed in order to isolate only 
the effect of the location change on the informativeness of the recommendation change.28   
Table 6, Panel B presents the results of this analysis. The Panel reveals that for the 
subsample of upgrades the U.S. location effect persists within and across broker moves. The 
coefficient on Local vs U.S.-Located remains significantly negative at -2.21% when analysts 
                                                          
27
 For example, the analyst might receive more training in the U.S. office of the bank, might change offices to a 
more prestigious broker with more resources, or might benefit from information spillovers from other parts of 
the broker in the U.S.  
28
 For example, if a German analyst working for Deutsche Bank that covers a German firm cross-listed in the 
US, moves to the New York office of Deutsche Bank and continues to cover the same German firm, we observe 
the change in location of the analyst while all other characteristics (firm, broker and analyst) remain constant.   
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move location, but remain with the same broker. The magnitude of the coefficient is, 
however, almost double (-4.35% compared to -2.21%) when the analyst moves broker at the 
same time of moving location.29 The results suggest that the location effect is less likely due 
to differences in characteristics within the same and across different brokers across locations. 
4.3. Are US-located analysts first to change recommendations and local analysts follow? 
The preceding analyses focus on finding explanations for the US-location premium to 
analyst recommendation changes documented in Table 4 and 5 based on analyst, firm and 
broker characteristics. In the following we investigate the timing of the recommendation 
changes, differences in the organization of analyst research and country-specific explanations. 
It is conceivable that U.S.-located analysts on average issue more informative 
recommendation changes due to being the leader in making a recommendation change that 
local analysts follow. That is, any market moving information might already be public with 
the first recommendation change for the firm, which happens to be one from a U.S. analyst, 
while local analysts piggy back on the recommendation change. U.S. analysts might be first 
mover in making recommendation changes because they might be faster in processing firm-
specific or industry information, might work for brokerages that have better access to inside 
information of firms they follow, or because international firms may tend to disclose 
information when their respective home markets are closed, but the U.S. market is still open 
giving U.S.-located analysts a timing advantage in preparing their recommendation changes. 
To investigate this potential explanation for our results we examine the relative timing 
of the recommendation changes for US-located and local analysts. For this we create an 
indicator variable Follower, that is assigned the value 1, if an analyst’s recommendation 
change is in the same direction and by the same magnitude as a previous recommendation 
change from a different analyst for the same firm within a 30-day period. Analogously, 
                                                          
29
 The coefficient on Local vs US Located for the subsample of downgrades is also weakly significantly positive 
for analysts that move to different brokers compared to an insignificant coefficient for downgrades from analysts 
that move within brokers. 
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Follower is equal to zero, if the recommendation change is different in magnitude or direction 
from a previous recommendation change for the same firm made by other analysts during the 
previous 30 days. 
 Table 7 Panel A reports the contingency table between Local vs U.S.-Located and 
Follower. Of the total of 16,473 recommendation changes by local analysts 2,820 (17.12%) 
are changes that have followed other analysts recommendation change announcements 
(Follower = 1). This compares to 738 US-located analyst recommendation changes as 
followers from a total of 4,157 US-located analysts (17.75%). That is, conditional on being a 
US-located analyst, the likelihood of also being a follower is slightly higher, not lower. This 
difference in frequencies, however, is not statistically significant (χ2 = 0.94). 
We further include the indicator variable Follower in our main regressions and also 
interact the variable with our main variable of interest Local vs U.S.-Located. The results are 
shown in Table 7, Panel B. The coefficient on Local vs U.S.-Located remains statistically 
significant at -2.53% for the subsample of upgrades. More interestingly, neither the 
coefficient on Follower, nor the interaction effect are statistically different from zero 
suggesting that the differential informativeness of US-located analysts is unlikely explained 
by them being the first to change the recommendations and local analysts being the followers. 
4.4. Does analyst specialization matter? 
Sonney (2009) and Salva and Sonney (2011) argue that brokerage houses organize their 
research along country and economic sectors and find that earnings forecasts and 
recommendations are relatively more informative from analysts with country-specific 
knowledge compared to sector-specialized analysts. It is thus possible, that the information 
advantage of U.S. analysts in our sample comes from them being predominantly country-
specialized. Sonney (2009) shows that the information advantage of country-specialized 
analysts stems from the geographical proximity between the analyst and the firm as well as 
from superior knowledge of country-specific factors.  
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Our findings that U.S.-located analysts issue more informative recommendation changes 
compared to local analysts stand in contrast to the proximity argument as local analysts are 
per definition always located closer to the firm than U.S. analysts. However, it is conceivable 
that the advantage of having country-specialized knowledge outweighs geographical 
proximity. We therefore follow Sonney (2009) in classifying each analyst observation in our 
sample as coming from a country or sector specialist.30 Table 8, Panel A reports the 
contingency table between Local vs U.S.-Located and Country Specialist and reveals that 
U.S.-located analysts are significantly less likely to be country-specialists. Of the total of 
1,811 recommendation changes by U.S. analysts only 292 (16.12%) are from country-
specialist, while 4,967 of the total of 8,005 local analyst recommendation changes (62.05%) 
come from country-specialists. That is, conditional on being a U.S.-located analyst, the 
likelihood of also being a country-specialist is significantly lower. This difference in 
frequencies is highly statistically significant (χ2 = 1300). 
Consistent with the contingency table, the regression results in Panel B show that 
conditioning on being a country-specialist does not affect the U.S. location premium. The 
coefficient on Local vs U.S.-Located remains statistically significant at -4.23% for the 
subsample of upgrades (equation 2) and the interaction effect with the country-specialist 
indicator variable is insignificantly different from zero. These results suggest that the U.S. 
location premium is unlikely explained by analyst specialization. 
4.5. Do country characteristics explain the results? 
One hypothesis why U.S.-located analysts’ recommendation changes are more 
informative to local market investors compared to local analysts’ is that the effect is driven by 
firms that cross-list in the U.S. from countries with weaker investor protection, corporate 
governance mechanisms and reporting and disclosure environments. Through a cross-listing 
                                                          
30
 We allow for analysts to move between categories e.g., when they move brokerages or locations. For this 
particular analysis we disregard analysts that according to Sonney’s (2009) methodology can neither be 
classified as country or sector specialists. Including this third category in our analysis does not change our 
inference. 
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firms from countries with weaker legal environments are able to bond themselves to the 
higher legal protection of minority shareholders in the U.S. (Coffee, 1999, 2002). Stulz (1999) 
highlights an important role of intermediaries in the bonding hypothesis: Analysts based in the 
U.S. add further scrutiny and monitoring for the home stock as information production might 
be more stringently regulated in the U.S.––and thus their recommendations might be 
perceived as more informative than those of home analysts. Moreover, if these analysts are 
employed by highly reputable investment banks they may further play a certification role for 
the cross-listed stock (Stulz 1999, Karolyi 2006). 
Generally, the improvement of the information environment that comes with a cross-
listing (Fernandes and Ferreira 2008) should be stronger for firms from countries with weak 
information environments. Furthermore, local market investors might pay more attention to 
information produced by US-located intermediaries due to perceived higher reliability of the 
information, higher accuracy, and potentially fewer conflicts of interests. Our main results 
that the differential informativeness is more pronounced for upgrades compared to 
downgrades points towards this explanation. Prior evidence suggest that analysts might be 
reluctant to downgrade firms they follow due to conflicts of interests related to their broker’s 
other business relationships with the firm. If these conflicts of interests are more pervasive 
between local analysts and local firms than between US-located analysts and these firms, then 
the location effect should be stronger for upgrades than downgrades, which is what we find.31  
If the bonding and certification hypotheses explain our findings we would expect our 
results to be stronger for analyst recommendation changes that are issued for firms from 
countries with weak investor protection, governance or disclosure environments. We therefore 
repeat our main regressions distinguishing our sample by the socio-economic, legal and 
political, regulatory and governance, and reporting and disclosure environment of the home 
                                                          
31
 Another reason might be that local market investors may be more concerned about buying shares after an 
upgrade from a local analyst when they believe that conflicts of interest or governance problems exist than about 
selling shares after a downgrade from a local analyst. 
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country of the cross-listed firm. We also include interaction effects of the particular country 
characteristic with our main variable of interest Local vs U.S.-Located.  
Table 9 reports the regression results. The table shows in each row the coefficient and t-
statistic for our main indicator Local vs U.S.-Located, the particular country characteristic and 
their interaction effect for each regression. All other control variables and year fixed effects 
are suppressed for ease of exposition. Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. If the 
certification hypothesis holds we should observe a positive coefficient on the interaction 
effect for upgrades and a negative coefficient on the interaction effect for downgrades. We 
predominantly find the contrary.  
For example, in the first row of Table 9 we report results distinguishing by whether the 
home country of the cross-listed firm is an advanced economy (country characteristic 
indicator = 1) or an emerging economy. The coefficient on the interaction effect shows that 
the differential market reaction to US-located analyst recommendation changes compared to 
local analysts is wider when the cross-listed firm is from an advanced economy (coefficient 
on the interaction effect = -0.90, p-value<0.05). We find similar results using proxies for the 
rule of law, accountability, and government effectiveness as well as the regulatory quality, 
corruption control and disclosure environment of the country. Depending on the proxy used 
we either find no difference in the premium for US-located recommendation changes across 
countries (interaction effect is not statistically different from zero) or find a higher premium 
for countries with the stronger legal, regulatory or disclosure environment (interaction effect 
is negative for upgrades and positive for downgrades).32 Overall, our findings suggest that 
recommendation changes by US-located analysts are significantly more informative for firms 
from countries with stronger legal, regulatory and disclosure environments. 
One explanation for these findings might be that U.S. investors are more likely to invest 
in countries that have a larger share in the world portfolio and these countries generally tend 
                                                          
32
 The only result (out of 18 proxies we use) that is consistent with the bonding hypothesis is when the sample is 
divided by legal origin (whether common or civil law). 
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to be stronger on the above characteristics. In that case, there is a larger demand for U.S. 
analysts covering firms in those countries resulting in more resources of U.S. intermediaries 
being devoted to these firms producing better information and in turn more responsive stock 
returns. This interpretation of our results is consistent with the findings in Bae, Stulz, Tan 
(2008) of a weaker local analyst advantage for stocks in countries with better disclosure 
environments and with findings in Bae, Bailey and Mao (2006) and Bae, Ozoguz, Tan, and 
Wirjanto (2012) that the openness of countries to foreign investors is correlated with a better 
information environment and more responsive stock returns.33 
However, the above interpretation would mean that US investors trade more in the 
home market of the stock instead of the equally liquid ADR34 or that trading in the U.S. in 
response to the U.S.-analyst recommendation change spills over to the home market. The 
preliminary evidence in Table 4 on abnormal volumes in the two markets is somewhat 
inconsistent with such explanation although not strong evidence against it. Abnormal volumes 
are significantly lower in the home market in response to a U.S.-located analyst 
recommendation change compared to that of a local analyst, while abnormal volumes are 
significantly higher in the U.S. in response to a U.S.-located analyst recommendation change.  
4.6. Alternative explanations and further robustness 
We further investigate whether investors over-react to US-analysts’ recommendation 
changes, or equally under-react to local analysts’ recommendation changes. If the incremental 
informativeness of U.S.-located analysts is explained by an over-reaction of home market 
investors to U.S.-analysts’ news or an under-reaction to local analysts’ recommendations, we 
should observe a (partial) reversal of the event-window effect over longer event horizons after 
the event date. In untabulated results we do not find evidence of a reversal of the effect over 5 
                                                          
33
 In untabulated results we find that the U.S. analyst location premium is larger for analysts that move from the 
U.S. to become a local analyst compared to analysts that move from a local analyst to become a U.S. analysts 
(difference = 1.36%). This suggests that the U.S. analysts that move away from the U.S. lose their ties to U.S. 
investors and the loss is larger than the increase in location premium of local analysts that move to the U.S., who 
likely lack recognition with U.S. investors in the immediate years after the move. 
34
 In addition to better liquidity, transaction and foreign exchange costs are likely also lower for a US investor 
when trading the ADR instead of the common stock in the home market of the firm.   
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days, 1 month or 3 months post-announcement of the recommendation changes for upgrades 
or downgrades. 
We also test the robustness of our results controlling for the geographical distance and 
conditioning our sample on broker reputation. Our findings that U.S. analysts’ 
recommendation changes are more informative than local analysts is somewhat contrary to 
Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) and Malloy (2005) who find and inverse relationship of 
forecasting quality and geographical distance between analyst and firm headquarters. 
Although U.S. analysts will per definition in almost all cases be located further away from the 
firm than local analysts, it is possible (although unlikely) that for some Canadian or Central 
and South American firms the U.S. analyst is physically located closer. We therefore directly 
test the effect of the distance by controlling for the proximity of the analyst to the 
headquarters of the firm measured as a direct distance in kilometres. In untabulated results we 
do not find any evidence that the geographical distance materially changes our inference. 
Lastly, we condition our main regression based on broker reputation to further assess 
whether the U.S. analyst location premium can be explained by a certification effect 
stemming from U.S. analysts being more likely to work for reputable brokers. Although we 
find in untabulated results that U.S. analysts are indeed significantly more likely to work for 
reputable (highly ranked) brokers, we do not find any evidence that this affects and explains 
our results.    
 
5. Conclusions 
We investigate stock return and trading volume reactions to analyst recommendation 
changes issued by local and foreign analysts for international stocks from 40 countries cross-
listed in the U.S from 2003-2007. We find strong evidence of a U.S.-location premium: Our 
main results show that recommendation changes by analysts based in the U.S. lead to 
significantly higher abnormal returns in both, the U.S. and the home market of the cross-listed 
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firm. We do not find such a differential effect for other foreign analysts. We further find that 
the results on the U.S.-location premium to analyst recommendation changes are stronger for 
recommendation upgrades than downgrades consistent with market concerns of higher 
conflicts of interest of local analysts.  
Our results are robust to various controls and to an identification strategy that uses a 
subsample of analysts that change status during our sample period from being a U.S-located 
analyst to become local analysts or vice versa. The U.S.-location premium persists within this 
subsample after isolating the effect of the location from unobserved differences in analyst, 
broker or firm characteristics. 
We further investigate whether the U.S.-location premium can be explained by a 
bonding facilitation and certification role of intermediaries in the U.S. for stocks that cross-list 
from countries with weaker legal, governance, and reporting environments. We find the 
opposite. Our findings that recommendation changes by U.S.-located analysts lead to a higher 
market reaction in the home market compared to recommendation changes by local analysts 
are stronger for firms from countries with stronger legal, governance, and reporting 
environments. We also do not find the differential effect to be explained by the relatively 
higher reputation of U.S. brokers.  
We explore alternative explanations for which we find little empirical support. For 
example, we examine whether the market over-reacts to U.S.-located analyst recommendation 
changes in the short-term. However, we do not find a reversal of the effect over longer-term 
horizons in the subsequent months of the recommendation change. We also find no evidence 
that U.S.-located analysts pre-empt local analysts’ recommendation changes or that the 
geographical distance to firms’ headquarters matters. 
  Overall, our findings suggest the existence of an economically significant U.S.-
location premium to analyst recommendation changes for cross-listed stocks, in particular for 
changes that reflect upgrades, which stands somewhat in contrast to prior findings of a local 
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analyst information advantage and at the same time cannot be explained by a bonding or 
certification role of U.S. analysts. Our findings suggest that an increase in U.S. analyst 
coverage that comes with a cross-listing facilitates U.S. investors’ access to investments in the 
foreign firm’s home market. U.S. analysts seem to cater to U.S. investor demand for their 
services for cross-listed stocks and improve information production and stock return 
responsiveness, in particular for firms from developed countries, where the local analyst 
advantage is smaller, and of which U.S. investors tend have a larger share within their global 
investment portfolio. We provide, however, only indirect evidence on the latter and invite 
further research into the role of U.S. and foreign intermediaries in catering to the demand for 
analyst services and their effects on the information environment of international firms. 
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
 
Broker and analyst characteristics 
  
Analyst Firm Experience 
Number of years analyst i has covered firm k minus the average number of years all 
other analysts have covered firm k. Source: Institutional Brokers' Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S) 
  
Analyst General 
Experience 
Number of years between recommendation l of analyst i and the analyst’s first 
recommendation recorded in I/B/E/S. Source: Institutional Brokers' Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S) 
  
Broker Reputation 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the analyst works for a brokerage firm that is ranked 
among the Top10 All-American broker in year t in the annual polls of Institutional 
Investor magazine. 
Source: Institutional Investor Magazine 
  
Broker Size  
Natural logarithm of the total number of analysts working for the brokerage firm j 
with which the recommending analyst i is associated in year t.  
Source: Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
  
Country Specialist 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the analyst is a country specialist, zero if the analyst 
is a sector specialist. An analyst is classified as a country specialist if her or his 
country Herfindahl Index (HI) is larger than 0.90 and her or his sector Herfindahl 
Index (HI) is smaller than 0.90. An analyst is classified as a sector specialist if her 
or his sector Herfindahl Index (HI) is larger than 0.90 and her or his country 
Herfindahl Index (HI) is smaller than 0.90. Following Sonney (2009) and Salva and 
Sonney (2011), for each analyst, both a sector and a country HI are computed as 
follows: 
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where αc = Nc,a,y/Na,y and αs = Ns,a,y/Na,y. ·  Nc,a,y (Ns,a,y) is the number of firms in 
country c (sector s) for which analyst a issued forecasts over fiscal year y. Na,y is 
the total number of firms followed by analyst a over fiscal year y. Sectors are 
defined according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) Level 1 
definitions which provide a hierarchy of 10 industries (Datastream item ICBIN). 
Sources: Sonney (2009) and Salva and Sonney (2011); Thomson Reuters 
Datastream; Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S). 
  
Expatriate Local vs U.S.-
Located 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the recommendation change is issued by an 
Expatriate local analyst and 0 if issued by an U. S. Located analyst. Source: 
Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research for 2004-2008; Bae, Stulz and Tan 
(2008). 
  
GeoDistance 
The shortest geographical distance measured in (thousand) kilometres between the 
firm’s headquarter city and the analyst’s office city. The geographical distance is 
computed using the Haversine formula as : 
 
 
 
2	 !" # $%&' ( %&2 ) * cos	.%&'/ .%&/	 # $%0' ( %02 )1 
 
where Latf and Longf are the geographical latitude and longitude of the firm city 
and Lata and Longa the geographical latitude and longitude of the analyst city 
expressed in decimal degrees, respectively. R is the mean radius of the earth 
(6371.10.km). Firms’ corporate office locations are obtained using the following 
Worldscope items: Street Address (WC06022); City (WC06023); State, Province, 
County or District (WC06024); Nation (WC06026). Analysts’ office locations are 
obtained from the Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research for 2004-2008. 
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Latitudes and longitudes are obtained with the Geocoding process in the Google 
Maps API Service. Analysts with missing data for the city location and firms 
headquartered in country different from the home listing country are excluded. 
Sources: Thomson Reuters Worldscope, Nelson’s Directory of Investment 
Research for 2004-2008; Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008). 
  
Local vs U.S- Located 
A dummy variable equal to the value 1 if the recommendation change is issued by 
a local analyst and 0 if issued by an U.S.-located analyst. Source: Nelson’s 
Directory of Investment Research for 2004-2008; Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008). 
  
Number Firms Followed Number of firms analyst i covers in year t in the I/B/E/S database Source: Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
  
Pure Local vs U.S.-
Located 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the recommendation change is issued by a Pure 
Local analyst and 0 if issued by an U. S. Located analyst. Source: Nelson’s 
Directory of Investment Research for 2004-2008; Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008). 
 
 
Recommendation characteristics 
 
 
Abs. Recommendation 
Change 
Absolute value of the recommendation change. For example, a recommendation 
change from underperform (=2) to buy (=4) has a value of 2. 
Source: Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
  
 
Concurrent Earnings 
Forecast 
Dummy variable equal to one if the recommending analyst issued an earnings 
forecast revision for the stock in the three day period surrounding the 
recommendation and the forecast revision was in the same direction as the 
recommendation change. Forecast revisions are computed as the current forecast 
for one-year-ahead earnings minus the prior forecast by the same analyst. Source: 
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S)  
  
 
Pre-Earnings 
Dummy variable equal to one if the recommendation change is issued in the two 
weeks prior to an earnings announcement. Source: Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S) 
  
Post-Earnings 
Dummy variable equal to one if the recommendation change is issued in the two 
weeks after an earnings announcement. Source: Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S) 
  
 
 
Firm Characteristics 
 
 
Analyst Coverage Total number of analysts covering the firm in the year of the recommendation 
change. Source: Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
  
Average Turnover 
Domestic average daily trading volume obtained as the number of domestic shares 
traded (Datastream item VO) scaled by the domestic number of shares outstanding 
(Datastream item NOSH) over the 63 days prior to the recommendation change. 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
  
Book-to-Market 
Book to market ratio computed as the book value of equity (Worldscope item 
WC03501) for the year ended before June 30, divided by market capitalization 
(Worldscope item WC08001) on December 31st of the same fiscal year. Negative 
values are excluded. Source: Thomson Reuters Worldscope 
  
Prev1M Domestic stock return over the 21 trading days prior to the recommendation 
change. Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
  
Prev1Y 
Domestic stock return over the prior 252 trading days prior to the recommendation 
change, excluding the 21 trading days prior to the recommendation change. Source: 
Thomson Reuters Datastream 
  
Size Domestic market capitalization (Datastream item MV) computed as share price 
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times total shares outstanding as of the end of June in the year prior to the 
recommendation change (in millions of dollars). Source: Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
 
 
Socio-economic environment 
 
 
Advanced Economy 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the country is an Advanced Economy and zero 
otherwise. Source: International Monetary Fund  (IMF) World Economic Outlook 
(2004-2008 Editions)  
  
GDP Per Capita Indicator variable equal to 1 if GDP per capita of the country is above the sample 
median. Values are time-varying. Source: World Bank national accounts data, and 
OECD National Accounts data files.  
  
Cultural Distance 
A measure of cultural distance based on Hofstede’s (2001) and Hofstede, Hofstede 
and Minkov’s (2010) cultural frameworks. Specifically, the definition of cultural 
distance (CDij) between home market i and host (U.S.) market j is based on Dodd, 
Frijns and Gilbert (2015): 
CDij = 2∑ 4567 ( 689/;6<=6  
where Ikj is country j’s score on the kth cultural dimension and Vk is the variance of 
the score of the dimension k. The higher the score on the cultural distance measure, 
the greater the cultural difference between countries i and j, based on the chosen 
cultural framework. The 6 cultural dimensions are: Uncertainty Avoidance, 
Individualism, Power Distance, Masculinity, Long-term vs Short term Orientation, 
Indulgence vs Restraint. The values are time-invariant. Source: own calculations 
based on Hofstede (2001), Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) and Dodd, Frijns 
and Gilbert (2015). 
 
 
Legal & political environment 
 
 
Legal origin 
Indicator is set equal to 1 if the countries legal origin is common law, and zero 
otherwise. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and  Shleifer (2008) 
  
Rule of Law 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
The variable ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). Values are time-varying. 
Source: World Bank data files and estimates. 
  
Voice and Accountability 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. The variable ranges from approximately -
2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). Values are time-varying. Source: World Bank data files 
and estimates 
  
Political Stability  
Measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-
motivated violence, including terrorism. The variable ranges from approximately -
2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). Values are time-varying. Source: World Bank data files 
and estimates.  
  
Government Effectiveness 
Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. The variable ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) 
to 2.5 (strong). Values are time-varying. Source: World Bank data files and 
estimates. 
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Regulatory & governance environment 
 
 
Regulatory Quality 
Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
The variable ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). Values are 
time-varying. Source: World Bank data files and estimates. 
 
 
Control of Corruption 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests. Ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong). Values are time-varying. Source: World Bank data files and estimates 
 
 
Anti-director rights index 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the anti-director rights index of the country is above 
the sample median. The anti-director rights index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) 
the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders are not 
required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting; (3) 
cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of 
directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) 
shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders 
meeting; and (6) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal 
to 10%. The index ranges from 0 to 6. A higher score indicates a higher level of 
investor protection. The index is time-invariant and based on data available in May 
2003. Source: Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) 
 
 
Anti-self-dealing index 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the anti-self-dealing rights index of the country is 
above the sample median. The anti-self-dealing index is formed by taking the 
average of ex ante and ex post private control of self-dealing indices. The index of 
ex ante control of self-dealing transactions is an average of approval by 
disinterested shareholders and ex ante disclosure. The index of ex post control of 
self-dealing transactions is an average of disclosures in periodic filings and ease of 
proving wrongdoing. A higher score indicates a higher level of strength of minority 
shareholder protection against self-dealing by the controlling shareholder. The 
index is time-invariant and based on data in May 2003. Source: Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) 
 
 
Reporting & disclosure environment 
 
 
CIFAR Transparency 
Index 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the index of the country is above the sample median. 
The index is created by the Center for Financial Analysis and Research based on 
firms’ 1995 annual reports. It counts the inclusion or omission of 90 items in the 
annual report in each country. The index covers a minimum of three companies and 
is time-invariant. Sources: CIFAR and Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) 
 
  
Disclosure Requirements 
Index 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the index of the country is above the sample median. 
The index captures disclosure requirements for domestic corporations that raise 
capital through an initial public offering on the country’s largest stock exchange. 
The index captures prospectus, compensation, shareholders; inside ownership; 
contracts; and transactions disclosures. A higher score indicates a higher level of 
disclosure. The index is time-invariant and based on data in May 2003. Source: 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) 
  
Reporting Frequency 
The within country average frequency of financial reports issued each year by all 
domestic public companies in each country using the Earnings Report Frequency 
Worldscope item (WC05200) . For each firm, its reporting frequency is coded as 1 
for quarterly reporting, 2 for semi-annual, 3 for three fixed interims, 4 for annual 
and 0 for missing quarter/quarters. Only domestic firms indicated as major stock 
and primary issue in a domestic stock exchange are considered.  
Data are from Thomson Reuters Worldscope countries’ constituent lists 
(WSCOPE[country_code]) for the 40 countries in the sample and are time-varying 
for 2003-2007. Source: own calculations 
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BIG 4 Auditor 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the fraction of public firms in the country that use a 
Big Four auditor is above the sample median (as reported in Hope, Kang, Thomas, 
and Yoo, 2008). The primary source for identifying the firm’s auditor is Compustat 
Global (CG#Auop1). The values are time-invariant and based on values computed 
between 1992 and 2004. 
Source: Hope, Kang, Thomas and Yoo (2008). 
 
Earnings quality 
 
Earnings Management 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings management and opacity scores of the 
country are above the sample median. Earnings management and opacity scores are 
based on Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) and tabulated and updated in Leuz 
(2010). These aggregate scores consist of 4 metrics measuring the extent to which 
firms’ reported earnings obfuscate or potentially misrepresent economic 
performance as a result of earnings smoothing and the use of reporting discretion. 
A higher score indicates a higher level of earnings management. The index is time-
invariant and based on values computed between 1996 and 2005. Source: Leuz, 
Nanda and Wysocki (2003) and Leuz (2010)  
 
 
Timely Bad News 
Recognition  
This variable captures the average country-level association between reported firm-
level earnings and bad news in stock returns as defined in Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006). The values of the variable are obtained by the country estimates of the 
coefficients β3 obtained from within country pooled regressions: NI = β0+ β1NEG + 
β2RET + β3RET*NEG, where NI is a firm’s reported net income (Worldscope item 
WC01706), RET is the annual stock return and NEG is a dummy variable which 
equals one if RET<0. A higher score means more timely recognition of bad news, 
i.e., higher quality financial reporting. Only domestic non-financial firms indicated 
as major stock and primary issue in a domestic stock exchange are considered. Data 
are from Thomson Reuters Worldscope countries’ constituent lists 
(WSCOPE[country_code]) for the 40 countries in the sample and are for the period 
1996-2005. The variable is time-invariant. Source: own calculations based on 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) 
 
 
  
 
  
 36 
 
References 
Ajinkya, B., Jain, P., 1989. The behavior of daily stock market trading volume. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 11, 331-359.  
Altinkilic, O., Hansen, R., 2009. On the information role of stock recommendation revisions. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 48, 17-36.  
Bae, K.-H., Bailey W., Mao, C., 2006. Stock market liberalization and the information environment. Journal of 
International Money and Finance 25, 404-428. 
Bae, K.-H., Stulz, R., Tan, H., 2008. Do local analysts know more? A cross-country study of the performance of 
local analysts and foreign analysts. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 581–606.  
Bae, K.-H., Tan, H., Welker, M., 2008. International GAAP differences: the impact on foreign analysts. 
Accounting Review 83, 593–628.  
Bae, K.-H., Ozoguz, A., Tan, H., Wirjanto, T., 2012. Do foreigners facilitate information transmission in 
emerging markets? Journal of Financial Economics 105, 209–227.  
Bailey, W., Karolyi, A., Salva, C., 2006. The economic consequences of increased disclosure. Evidence form 
international cross-listings. Journal of Financial Economics 81, 175-213.  
Baker, H., Nofsinger, J., Weaver, D., 2002. International cross-listing and visibility. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 37, 495–521.  
Bradshaw, M., Bushee, B., Miller, T., 2004. Accounting choice, home bias and U.S. investment in non-U.S. 
firms. Journal of Accounting Research 42, 795–841.  
Bushman, R., Piotroski, J., Smith, A., 2004. What determines corporate transparency? Journal of Accounting 
Research 42, 207-252.  
Bushman, R., Piotroski, J., 2006. Financial reporting incentives for conservative accounting: the influence of 
legal and political institutions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42, 107–148.  
Campbell, C., Cowan, A., Salotti, V., 2010. Multi-country event-study methods. Journal of Banking and Finance 
34, 3078-3090.  
Coffee, J., 1999. The future as history: the prospects for global convergence in corporate governance and its 
implications. Northwestern University Law Review 93, 641–708.  
Coffee, J., 2002. Racing towards the top? The impact of cross-listings and stock market competition on 
international corporate governance. Columbia Law Review 102, 1757–1831. 
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2008. The law and economics of self-dealing. 
Journal of Financial Economics 88, 430–465.  
Dodd, O., Frijns, B., Gilbert, A., 2015. On the role of cultural distance in the decision to cross-list. European 
Financial Management 21,706-741.  
Doidge, C., 2004. U.S. cross-listings and the private benefits of control: evidence from dual-class firms. Journal 
of Financial Economics 72, 519–553. 
Doidge, C., Karolyi, A., Stulz, R., 2004. Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth more? Journal of 
Financial Economics 71, 205–238. 
Doidge, C., Karolyi, A., Stulz, R., 2007. Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance? Journal of 
Financial Economics 86, 1-39.  
Edison, H., Warnock, F., 2004. U.S. investors emerging market equity portfolios: a security-level analysis. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 86, 391–704.  
 37 
 
Fernandes, N., Ferreira, M., 2008. Does international cross-listing improve the information environment? Journal 
of Financial Economics 88, 216-244.  
Foerster, R., Karolyi, A., 1999. The effects of market segmentation and investor recognition on asset prices: 
evidence from foreign stocks listing in the United States.  Journal of Finance 54, 981–1013.  
Gagnon, L., Karolyi, A., 2009. Information, trading volume, and international stock return comovements. 
Evidence from cross-listed stocks. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 953-986. 
Gagnon, L., Karolyi, A., 2010. Multi–market trading and arbitrage. Journal of Financial Economics 97, 53-80.  
Halling, M., Pagano, M., Randl, O., Zechner, J., 2008. Where is the market? Evidence from cross-listings in the 
U.S. Review of Financial Studies 21, 725-761.  
Hofstede G., 2001. Culture's consequences: comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across 
nations. 2nd Edition, Thousand Oaks CA,  Sage Publications.  
Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., Minkov, M., 2010. Cultures and organizations: software of the mind. Revised and 
expanded 3rd Edition, New York, McGraw-Hill, USA.  
Hope, O., Kang, T., Thomas, W., Yoo, Y., 2008. Culture and auditor choice: a test of the secrecy hypothesis. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 27, 357-373.  
Jegadeesh, N., Kim, J., Kirsche, S., Lee, C., 2004. Analyzing the analysts: when do recommendations add value? 
Journal of Finance 59, 108-1124.  
Karolyi, A., 2004. The role of ADRs in the development of emerging equity markets. Review of Economics and 
Statistics 86,  670–690.  
Karolyi, A., 2006. The world of cross-listings and cross-listings of the world. Challenging conventional wisdom. 
Review of Finance 10, 99-152.  
Kim, O., Verrecchia, R., 1991. Trading volume and price reactions to public announcements. Journal of 
Accounting Research 29, 302 – 321.  
Kim, O., Verrecchia, R., 1994. Market liquidity and volume around earnings announcements. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 17, 41 - 67.  
Lang, M., Lins, K., Miller, D., 2003. ADRs, analysts, and accuracy: does cross listing in the United States 
improve a firm’s information environment and increase market value? Journal of Accounting Research 
41, 317-345.  
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer A., Vishny R., 1998. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy 
106, 1113-1155.  
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer A., 2008. The economic consequences of legal origins.  Journal of 
Economic Literature 46,  285-332.  
Li, E.X., Ramesh, K., Shen, M., Wu, J.S., 2015. Do analyst stock recommendations piggyback on recent 
corporate news? An analysis of regular-hour and after-hours revisions. Journal of Accounting Research 
53, 821-861.  
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., Wysocki, P., 2003. Earnings management and investor protection: an international 
comparison. Journal of Financial Economics 69, 505– 527. 
Leuz, C., 2010. Different approaches to corporate reporting regulation: how jurisdictions differ and why. 
Accounting and Business Research 40, 229–256.  
Ljungqvist, A., Malloy, C., Marston, F., 2009. Rewriting history. Journal of Finance 64, 1935–1960. 
Malloy, C., 2005. The Geography of equity analysts. Journal of Finance 60, 719-755.  
 38 
 
O'Brien, P., Tan, H., 2015. Geographic proximity and analyst coverage decisions: evidence from IPOs. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 59, 41-59.  
Reese, W., Weisbach, M., 2002. Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross listings in the United States, 
and subsequent equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics 66, 65–104.  
Salva, C., Sonney, F., 2011. The value of analysts’ recommendations and the organization of financial research. 
Review of Finance 15, 397-440 
Sonney, F. 2009. Sector versus country specialization and financial analysts’ performance. Review of Financial 
Studies 22, 2087–2131. 
Stickel, S., 1995. The anatomy of buy and sell recommendations. Financial Analyst Journal 51, 25-39.  
Stulz, R., 1999. Globalization, corporate finance and the cost of capital.  Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 
12, 8-25.  
Womack, K., 1996. Do brokerage analysts’ recommendations have investment value? Journal of Finance 51, 
137-167.  
Yezegel, A., 2015. Why do analysts revise their stock recommendations after earnings announcements? Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 59, 163–181.  
 39 
 
Table 1. Analyst and Recommendation Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Analysts and Recommendation Statistics by Country 
    Number of Recommendations Changes/Reiterations issued by  Number of Analysts 
Country # of firms (%)  Local Analysts Foreign Analysts Total No. of Rec. 
Changes/Reit. 
(%)  Local Analyst Foreign Analysts Total No. of Analysts 
by countries obs. 
        
Pure Expatriate Foreign Foreign U.S.- 
 
  
  Pure Expatriate Foreign Foreign U.S.-  
Local Local SR DR Located     Local Local SR DR Located 
 
Argentina 11 2.00%  23 2 4 24 18 53 0.19%  2 1 1 14 11 18 
Australia 11 2.00%  170 332 24 37 28 563 1.98%  32 61 2 10 6 105 
Austria 1 0.18%  1 0 55 0 0 56 0.20%  1 0 20 0 0 21 
Belgium 1 0.18%  26 2 72 2 2 102 0.36%  7 2 26 1 1 36 
Brazil 36 6.55%  590 363 1 643 463 1,597 5.61%  53 28 1 75 59 157 
Canada 196 35.64%  5,192 781 1,777 318 1,777 8,068 28.36%  396 68 384 63 384 911 
Chile 11 2.00%  72 43 33 100 82 248 0.87%  5 9 8 27 21 49 
China 14 2.55%  46 59 346 329 194 780 2.74%  12 15 87 78 47 192 
Colombia 1 0.18%  0 0 0 6 5 6 0.02%  0 0 0 2 2 2 
Denmark 3 0.55%  26 47 150 5 5 228 0.80%  5 15 55 1 1 76 
Finland 2 0.36%  48 11 307 84 79 450 1.58%  9 5 68 28 27 110 
France 21 3.82%  317 144 956 61 47 1,478 5.19%  98 38 282 30 26 448 
Germany 13 2.36%  764 76 597 73 66 1,510 5.31%  109 28 187 31 29 355 
Greece 2 0.36%  52 8 117 2 2 179 0.63%  13 2 34 1 1 50 
Hong Kong 10 1.82%  342 127 294 496 289 1,259 4.42%  59 35 67 107 56 268 
Hungary 1 0.18%  5 0 28 1 1 34 0.12%  2 0 11 1 1 14 
India 11 2.00%  169 326 46 90 60 631 2.22%  42 55 9 19 14 125 
Indonesia 2 0.36%  17 27 100 34 15 178 0.63%  7 8 13 5 2 33 
Ireland 5 0.91%  43 0 225 21 21 289 1.02%  14 0 61 8 8 83 
Israel 10 1.82%  6 12 0 19 12 37 0.13%  2 3 0 9 4 14 
Italy 7 1.27%  106 88 242 11 11 447 1.57%  30 21 86 5 5 142 
Japan 26 4.73%  369 684 8 54 35 1,115 3.92%  76 109 2 18 11 205 
Luxembourg 2 0.36%  0 0 65 25 21 90 0.32%  0 0 22 8 6 30 
Mexico 21 3.82%  89 0 31 309 241 429 1.51%  14 0 4 58 45 76 
Netherlands 16 2.91%  311 198 912 89 84 1,510 5.31%  62 38 237 29 27 366 
New Zealand 2 0.36%  0 15 8 0 0 23 0.08%  0 6 2 0 0 8 
Norway 6 1.09%  196 145 188 4 4 533 1.87%  34 29 61 1 1 125 
Peru 1 0.18%  1 0 6 32 30 39 0.14%  1 0 2 9 8 12 
Philippines 1 0.18%  1 10 17 21 5 49 0.17%  1 5 4 6 3 16 
Portugal 3 0.55%  20 5 159 0 0 184 0.65%  7 2 43 0 0 52 
Russia 5 0.91%  43 12 75 19 16 149 0.52%  10 2 20 6 5 38 
South Africa 8 1.45%  188 227 0 175 76 590 2.07%  16 19 0 40 15 75 
South Korea 8 1.45%  298 164 18 86 67 566 1.99%  61 37 7 19 11 124 
Spain 5 0.91%  23 87 346 15 15 471 1.66%  10 20 85 4 4 119 
Sweden 1 0.18%  13 3 17 0 0 33 0.12%  4 1 7 0 0 12 
Switzerland 10 1.82%  103 35 618 38 34 794 2.79%  33 14 156 10 9 213 
Taiwan 7 1.27%  44 231 68 101 71 444 1.56%  12 41 20 34 26 107 
Turkey 1 0.18%  18 0 46 8 8 72 0.25%  6 0 10 2 2 18 
United Kingdom 57 10.36%  1,163 1,320 327 334 262 3,144 11.05%  270 248 120 96 81 734 
Venezuela 1 0.18%  0 1 3 21 11 25 0.09%  0 1 1 8 5 10 
Total 550 100.00%  10,895 5,585 8,286 3,687 4,157 28,453 100.00%    All Analysts 3,876 
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Panel B:  Analyst and Recommendation Statistics by Year 
   
Number of Recommendations Changes/Reiterations issued by 
 
 Number of Analysts 
   
Year # of firms (%) Local Analysts Foreign Analysts # of Rec. 
Changes/Reit. 
(%)  Local Analysts Foreign Analysts # of Analysts 
by year obs. 
Year(s) with Rec. 
Changes/Reit. 
# of firms  
   Pure Expatriate Foreign Foreign U.S.-    Pure Expatriate Foreign Foreign U.S.-     
   Local Local SR DR Located    Local Local SR DR Located .    
2003 432 56.73% 2,256 1,613 2,060 902 990 6,831 24.01%  655 512 755 274 313 2,196 5 Years 312  
2004 442 12.00% 2,115 1,411 1,612 624 642 5,762 20.25%  710 459 686 212 233 2,067 4 Years 66  
2005 436 10.91% 2,251 917 1,746 623 727 5,537 19.46%  681 361 606 236 274 1,884 3 Years 60  
2005 448 11.64% 2,223 854 1,446 783 881 5,306 18.65%  676 315 589 250 291 1,830 2 Years 64  
2007 422 8.73% 2,050 790 1,422 755 917 5,017 17.63%  620 288 533 220 267 1,661 1 Year 48  
  100.00% 10,895 5,585 8,286 3,687 4,157 28,453 100.00%    All Analysts 3,869 All Firms 550  
                    
This table reports analyst and recommendation summary statistics for firms cross-listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX as ADR Level II, ADR Type III and Ordinary Shares 
between 2003 and 2007 by country (Panel A) and year (Panel B). Recommendations and analysts are grouped into seven analyst-location categories: Local refers to a recommendation 
change or reiteration issued by an analyst whose location is the same as the covered firm. Foreign refers to a recommendation change or reiteration issued by analysts who are located 
in a different country from the firm they cover. Pure Local and Expatriate Local are the subsets of the Local category. Pure local analysts work for local research firms, while 
Expatriate Local analysts work for research firms from foreign countries. Foreign_SR and Foreign_DR and subsets of the Foreign category. Foreign_SR are analysts located in a 
different country from the firm they cover but in the same geographical region. Foreign_DR are analysts located in a different country from the firm they cover and in a different 
geographical region. US-located is a subset of the Foreign category that refers to analyst who are located in the United States. US-located analyst can belong to the Foreign_SD or to 
the Foreign_DR category. The sum of analysts following firms as Pure Local, Expatriate Local,  Foreign_SR,  Foreign_DR  does not equal the total actual number of analysts since a 
given analyst can follow more than one firm in more than one sector and can change location in a given year.  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Recommendation Changes 
 Current Recommendation    
 (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)  Total 
Prior 
Recommendation 
Strong Buy Buy Hold Underperform Sell   
(5) Strong Buy 509 
14.21% 
1,100 
30.72% 
1,686 
47.08% 
110 
3.07% 
176 
4.91% 
 3,581 
100% 
        
(4) Buy 1,093 
12.58% 
2,382 
27.41% 
4,539 
52.23% 
603 
6.94% 
73 
0.84% 
 8,690 
100% 
        
(3) Hold 1,659 
14.47% 
4,252 
37.09% 
3,051 
26.61% 
1,901 
16.58% 
601 
5.24% 
 11,464 
100% 
        
(2) Underperfom 94 
2.62% 
578 
16.09% 
1,844 
51.32% 
869 
24.19% 
208 
5.79% 
 3,593 
100% 
        
(1) Sell 182 
16.18% 
83 
7.38% 
617 
54.84% 
138 
12.27% 
105 
9.33% 
 1,125 
100% 
        
Total 3,537 8,395 1,1737 3,621 1,163  28,453 
The sample of recommendation changes/reiterations are from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. and International Files 
2003 to 2007. Each recommendation change (reiteration) is an analyst’s current rating minus his prior 
rating. Ratings are coded as 1 (sell) to strong buy (5), and rating changes lie between -4 and 4. 
Anonymous analysts are excluded. The table reports the transition probabilities of recommendation 
changes/reiterations. For example in column 4, when the prior recommendation is a hold, it has a 37.09% 
of transiting to a buy rating.  
 
Fig. 1. Transition Probabilities of Recommendation Changes 
 
The sample of recommendation changes/reiterations are from I/B/E/S Detail U.S. and International Files 
2003 to 2007. Each recommendation change (reiteration) is an analyst’s current rating minus his prior rating. 
Ratings are coded as 1 (sell) to strong buy (5), and rating changes lie between -4 and 4. Anonymous analysts 
are excluded. The chart plots the probability that a prior recommendation transits to any of the five rating 
categories. 
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Table 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) and Volumes (CAV)  
   CAR [-1, +1]  CAV [-1, +1] 
Rec. 
Change/Reit. 
# of Rec 
Change/reit 
(%) Home US (H – US)  Home US (H – US) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
   Mean H Median H Mean U.S. Median U.S. (col. 1 – col.3) (col. 2 – col. 4)  Mean H Median H Mean U.S. Median U.S. (col. 7 – col. 9) (col. 8 –col. 10) 
                
-4 176 0.62% -1.61*** -0.89*** -1.63*** -1.09*** 0.02 0.20  8.40*** 10.73*** 10.84*** 9.38*** -2.44 0.45 
   (-3.05) (-3.53) (-3.08) (-4.01) (0.07) (0.65)  (3.43) (7.46) (6.14) (6.72) (-0.94) (1.04) 
-3 183 0.64% -3.98*** -0.92*** -3.77*** -0.95*** -0.21 0.03  11.75*** 11.32*** 9.26*** 8.74*** 2.49 2.58** 
   (-3.84) (-4.08) (-3.56) (-3.38) (-0.95) (-1.60)  (6.33) (7.99) (4.62) (6.15) (1.38) (2.56) 
-2 2,890 10.16% -1.79*** -0.82*** -1.82*** -0.85*** 0.03 0.03  9.50*** 10.38*** 8.69*** 8.39*** 0.81* 1.99*** 
   (-13.02) (-16.47) (-12.93) (-15.80) (0.61) (0.53)  (21.97) (31.12) (22.09) (25.26) (1.94) (5.53) 
-1 7,748 27.23% -1.54*** -0.86*** -1.58*** -0.82*** 0.04 -0.04  9.33*** 10.22*** 8.02*** 7.96*** 1.31*** 2.26*** 
   (-22.67) (-25.32) (-22.44) (-24.07) (1.20) (-0.39)  (37.41) (50.74) (34.72) (40.52) (5.26) (11.24) 
0 6,916 24.31% -0.03 -0.08** -0.07 -0.06** 0.04 -0.02  3.94*** 6.34*** 3.60*** 4.79*** 0.34 1.55*** 
   (-0.76) (-1.98) (-1.37) (-2.31) (1.23) (-0.47)  (14.91) (35.15) (15.52) (25.70) (1.18) (7.64) 
+1 7,327 25.75% 1.14*** 0.62*** 1.14*** 0.68*** 0.00 -0.04  8.30*** 9.75*** 7.00*** 7.51*** 1.30*** 2.24*** 
   (19.59) (20.73) (18.20) (20.02) (0.05) (-1.30)  (34.64) (48.20) (29.78) (38.47) (5.05) (10.56) 
+2 2,854 10.03% 0.90*** 0.53*** 0.89*** 0.59*** 0.01 -0.06  7.60*** 9.29*** 6.04*** 7.09*** 1.56*** 2.20*** 
   (8.12) (11.15) (7.43) (10.38) (0.26) (-0.81)  (19.29) (29.03) (16.46) (21.84) (3.75) (7.73) 
+3 177 0.62% 0.62** 0.28** 0.72** 0.20* -0.10 -0.08  5.94*** 8.18*** 5.44** 5.67*** 0.50 2.51* 
   (2.29) (2.05) (2.16) (1.73) (-0.44) (-0.14)  (3.34) (6.43) (2.43) (5.86) (0.20) (1.68) 
+4 182 0.64% 1.25*** 0.88*** 1.18*** 0.81*** -0.07 -0.07  6.57*** 9.08*** 6.66*** 6.71*** -0.09 2.37** 
   (3.01) (4.31) (2.80) (3.45) (0.34) (0.71)  (3.47) (5.86) (4.65) (5.08) (-0.04) (2.19) 
                  
Upgrades 10,540 37.04% 1.07*** 0.54*** 1.06*** 0.33*** 0.01 0.22  8.03*** 8.35*** 6.70*** 6.07*** 1.33*** 2.28*** 
   (20.90) (23.94) (19.35) (22.77) (0.16) (-1.42) 
 
 (39.69) (56.90) (34.15) (44.86) (6.11) (13.36) 
                  
Downgrades 10,997 38.65% -1.65*** -0.71*** -1.68*** -0.61*** 0.03 -0.09  9.37*** 9.27*** 8.26*** 6.74*** 1.13*** 2.53*** 
   (-26.14) (-30.65) (-25.87) (-29.24) (1.19) (-0.20)  (43.64) (60.53) (41.79) (48.61) [5.34] (12.75) 
Total 28,453 100.00%                
 
This table reports domestic and foreign cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in percent and cumulative abnormal volumes (CAVs) following recommendation changes and reiterations for firms cross-
listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX as ADR Level II, ADR Level III or Ordinary Shares between 2003 and 2007 over a three-day [-1, +1] event window. Each recommendation change (reiteration) is 
an analyst’s current rating minus her prior rating. Ratings are coded as 1 (sell) to strong buy (5), and rating changes lie between -4 and +4.  Mean (columns 1 and 3) and median (columns 2 and 4) 
Domestic (Foreign) abnormal returns are measured as the domestic (foreign) raw return less the return on their national (US) stock market index. Similarly, mean (columns 7 and 9) and median (columns 8 
and 10) domestic (foreign) abnormal volumes are computed as the domestic (foreign) raw volume less the average domestic (foreign) volume. (H-US) differences report differences in means and medians 
for cumulative abnormal returns (columns 5 and 6) and volumes (columns 11 and 12) computed between the domestic and US markets for a same category or ratings change. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. t-statistics for the two-sided test and z-statistics for the one sample and two-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are in parentheses below the mean and 
median estimates, respectively. Differences in means are computed assuming equal variance. 
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Table 4.  Differences in CARs and CAVs between Home and US Markets by Analysts Locations 
Panel A: Upgrades 
     
  CAR [-1; +1]  CAV [-1; +1] 
         
Analyst Location Obs. Home U.S. (H – U.S.)  Home U.S. (H – U.S.) 
                 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  Mean Median Mean Median (col. 1 – col. 3) (col. 2 – col.4)  Mean Median Mean Median (col. 7 – col. 9) (col. 8 – col. 10) 
Local  6,388 1.06*** 0.59*** 1.03*** 0.59*** 0.03 0.01  8.62*** 9.95*** 6.48*** 7.13*** 2.14*** 2.82*** 
 
 (16.14) (17.46) (14.64) (16.20) (0.81) (0.25)  (33.64) (44.28) (25.25) (33.16) (7.78) (13.46) 
Pure Local  4,415 1.04*** 0.55*** 0.99*** 0.49*** 0.05 0.06  9.05*** 10.01*** 7.21*** 7.67*** 1.84*** 2.34*** 
  (12.44) (13.08) (11.23) (11.86) (1.17) (0.69)  (29.75) (36.89) (22.69) (28.89) (5.77) (9.22) 
Expatriate Local  1,973 1.09*** 0.73*** 1.11*** 0.85*** -0.02 -0.12  7.68*** 9.86*** 4.85*** 5.93*** 2.83*** 3.93*** 
   (10.96) (11.94) (9.88) (11.47) (-0.16) (-0.50)  (16.16) (24.53) (11.33) (16.35) (5.25) (10.03) 
Foreign 4,152 1.08*** 0.60*** 1.11*** 0.74*** -0.03 -0.14***  7.13*** 9.02*** 7.04*** 7.57*** 0.08 1.45*** 
 
 (13.28) (16.55) (12.68) (16.24) (-0.81) (-2.59)  (21.68) (35.78) (23.18) (30.35) (0.24) (4.53) 
Foreign_SR  2,933 1.06*** 0.56*** 1.11*** 0.70*** -0.05 -0.15**  7.66*** 8.58*** 6.51*** 7.21*** 1.15*** 1.37*** 
   (11.14) (13.21) (10.84) (13.18) (-1.12) (-2.22)  (21.05) (31.25) (19.35) (24.94) (3.06) (5.80) 
Foreign_DR  1,219 1.13*** 0.75*** 1.12*** 0.83*** 0.01 -0.08  5.85*** 10.02*** 8.34*** 8.76*** -2.50*** 1.26 
   (7.25) (10.02) (6.61) (9.47) (0.14) (-1.22)  (8.42) (17.47) (12.92) (17.26) (-3.13) (-0.53) 
U.S.-located  1,417 1.89*** 1.04*** 1.95*** 1.26*** -0.06 -0.22*  7.26*** 10.16*** 10.92*** 11.09*** -3.66*** -0.93*** 
   (10.49) (13.10) (10.21) (12.71) (-0.23) (-1.77)  (11.40) (19.30) (18.00) (21.99) (-5.58) (-5.55) 
 
(Local – U.S.-located) 
 
-0.83*** 
(-4.36) 
 
-0.45*** 
(-5.33) 
 
-0.92*** 
(-4.55) 
 
-0.67*** 
(-5.66) 
    
1.34** 
(1.96) 
 
-0.21 
(-0.06) 
 
-4.45*** 
(-6.75) 
 
-3.96*** 
(-9.88) 
  
 
(Pure Local – U.S.-located) 
 
-0.85*** 
(-4.31) 
 
-0.49*** 
(-5.62) 
 
-0.96*** 
(-4.57) 
 
-0.77*** 
(-6.06) 
    
1.78** 
(2.53) 
 
-0.01  
(-0.22) 
 
-3.72*** 
(-5.43) 
 
-3.42***  
(-7.99) 
  
 
(Exp. Local – U.S.-located) 
 
-0.79*** 
(-3.85) 
 
-0.31*** 
(-3.51) 
 
-0.84*** 
(-3.80) 
 
-0.41*** 
(-3.51) 
    
0.36 
(0.46) 
 
-0.30  
(-0.60) 
 
-6.08*** 
(-8.18) 
 
-5.16*** 
(-11.27) 
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Panel B: Downgrades 
               
  CAR [-1; +1]  CAV [-1; +1] 
               
Analyst Location Obs. Home U.S. (H – U.S.)  Home U.S. (H – U.S.) 
               
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  (col. 1 – col. 3) (col. 2 – col.4)  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  (col. 7 – col. 9) (col. 8 – col. 10) 
Local  6,633 -1.65*** -0.82*** -1.63*** -0.76*** -0.02 -0.04  9.99*** 10.59*** 8.32*** 8.08*** 1.67*** 2.51*** 
 
 (-19.90) (-22.28) (-19.53) (-21.36) (-0.59) (-1.15)  (37.09) (46.74) (32.07) (36.84)  (6.36) (12.16) 
Pure Local  4,646 -1.78*** -0.79*** -1.75*** -0.78*** -0.03 -0.01  10.62*** 10.62*** 9.08*** 8.35*** 1.53** 2.27*** 
  (-16.43) (-18.23) (-16.10) (-17.57) (-0.68) (-0.98)  (32.80) (39.51) (27.99) (31.49) (5.06) (8.88) 
Expatriate Local  1,987 -1.35*** -0.87*** -1.35*** -0.78*** 0.00 -0.09  8.52*** 10.57*** 6.55*** 7.23*** 1.96*** 3.34*** 
   (-12.07) (-12.83) (-11.85) (-12.21) (-0.04) (-0.64)  (17.62) (24.95) (15.75) (19.12) (3.85) (8.465) 
Foreign 4,364 -1.64*** -0.89*** -1.75*** -0.93*** 0.11*** 0.04  8.47*** 9.95*** 8.16*** 8.21*** 0.31 1.74*** 
 
 (-17.00)  (-21.33) (-16.99)  (-20.13) (2.59) (1.08)  (23.87) (38.50) (26.83) (31.77) (0.89) (5.20) 
Foreign_SR  3,027 -1.66*** -0.90*** -1.75*** -0.93*** 0.09** -0.87  8.95*** 9.76*** 8.19*** 7.91*** 0.75* 1.85*** 
   (-14.31) (-18.36) (-14.23) (-17.20) (1.96) (0.34)  (22.25) (32.82) (22.97) (26.47) (1.85) (4.40) 
Foreign_DR  1,337 -1.61*** -0.86*** -1.77*** -0.91*** 0.16*  0.06  7.40*** 10.18*** 8.10*** 8.74*** -0.70  1.45*** 
   (-9.19) (-10.98) (-9.29) (-10.57) (1.69) (1.33)  (10.33) (20.15) (13.99) (17.53) (-0.84) (2.71) 
U.S.-located  1,583 -2.51*** -1.27*** -2.59*** -1.35*** 0.08 0.08  10.26*** 11.65*** 12.68*** 11.86*** -2.42*** -0.21*** 
   (-12.49)  (-15.06) (-12.38)  (-14.56) (1.15) (-0.57)  (16.46) (23.35) (22.70) (23.73) (-4.20) (-2.90) 
 
(Local – U.S.-located) 
 
0.86*** 
(3.95) 
 
0.45*** 
(4.71) 
 
0.96*** 
(4.26) 
 
0.59*** 
(4.91) 
   
-0.28  
(-0.42) 
 
-1.06*** 
(-2.97) 
 
-4.37*** 
(-7.09) 
 
-3.78***  
(-9.30) 
 
 
(Pure Local – U.S.-located) 
 
0.79*** 
(3.21) 
 
0.48*** 
(4.52) 
 
0.84*** 
(3.56) 
 
0.57*** 
(4.61) 
   
0.34 
(0.49) 
 
-1.03**  
(-2.52) 
 
-3.61*** 
(-5.59) 
 
-3.51***  
(-7.63) 
 
 
(Exp. Local – U.S.-located) 
 
1.16*** 
(5.03) 
 
0.41*** 
(3.95) 
 
1.24*** 
(5.21) 
 
0.44*** 
(4.31) 
   
-1.74**  
(-2.21) 
 
-1.47***  
(-3.15) 
 
-6.12***  
(-8.79) 
 
-3.12***  
(-10.33) 
 
 
This table reports percent domestic and foreign cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and cumulative abnormal volumes (CAVs) following recommendation changes for firms cross-listed on NYSE, Nasdaq and 
AMEX as ADR Level II, ADR Level III or Ordinary Shares between 2003 and 2007 over a three-day [-1, +1] event window. Panel A shows the results for upgrades, Panel B for downgrades. Recommendations 
are grouped into seven analyst-location categories: Local refers to a recommendation changes issued by analysts whose location is the same as the covered firm. Foreign refers to recommendation changes 
issued by analysts who are located in a different country from the firm they cover. Pure Local and Expatriate Local are subsets of the Local category. Pure Local analysts work for local research firms, while 
Expatriate Local analysts work for research firms from foreign countries. Foreign_SR and Foreign_DR and subsets of the Foreign category. Foreign_SR are analysts located in a different country from the firm 
they cover but in the same geographical region. Foreign_DR are analysts located in a different country from the firm they cover and in a different geographical region. U.S.-located is a subset of the Foreign 
category that refers to analysts who are located in the United States. U.S.-located analyst can belong to the Foreign_SD or to the Foreign_DR category. Mean and median domestic (foreign) abnormal returns are 
measured as the domestic (foreign) raw return less the return on their national (U.S.) stock market index. Similarly, mean and median domestic (foreign) abnormal volumes are computed as the domestic 
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(foreign) raw volume less the average domestic (foreign) volume. (H-U.S.) columns report differences in means and medians for CARs (columns 5 and 6) and CAVs (columns 11 and 12) computed between the 
domestic and US markets for a same category of analysts and (local – U.S.-located) rows report differences in means and medians for CARs and CAVs by analyst location. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. t-statistics for the two-sided test and z-statistics for the one sample and two-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests and rank-sum tests are in parentheses below the mean and median 
estimates, respectively. Differences in means are computed assuming equal variance for the (H-US) difference and unequal variance for the (local-US-located difference). 
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Table 5.  Cross-Sectional Regressions on Home Market CARs 
 Upgrades  Downgrades 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Local vs U.S.-Located -0.822 -0.500 -2.066 -2.712  1.102 0.401 -0.789 -0.125 
(-3.39)*** (-2.00)** (-2.11)** (-2.27)**  (4.06)*** (1.67)* (-0.89) (-0.14) 
Pure Local vs U.S.-Located -0.943  1.075 
(-3.12)***  (3.15)*** 
Expatriate Local vs U.S.- Located -0.898  1.368 
(-3.17)***  (4.44)*** 
Broker Size 0.148 0.104 0.123 0.186 -0.008 0.037  -0.100 -0.191 -0.090 -0.277 0.127 0.266 
(2.07)** (0.94) (0.99) (2.33)** (-0.03) (0.09)  (-1.43) (-1.87)* (-0.76) (-4.07)*** (0.37) (0.45) 
Broker Reputation -0.104 -0.325 -0.023 0.214 1.005 1.137  0.376 0.761 0.073 -0.367 0.001 1.149 
(-0.43) (-0.76) (-0.08) (0.96) (1.93)* (1.79)*  (1.38) (1.69)* (0.25) (-1.63) (0.00) (0.78) 
Analyst General Experience 0.051 0.047 0.033 0.018 -0.098 0.257  -0.056 -0.046 -0.071 0.008 -0.466 -0.162 
(1.77)* (1.34) (0.70) (0.57) (-0.17) (0.39)  (-1.57) (-1.08) (-1.31) (0.26) (-0.75) (-0.19) 
Analyst Firm Experience -0.035 -0.030 0.013 -0.017 -0.036 -0.037  -0.003 -0.007 0.001 -0.070 -0.064 -0.129 
(-0.98) (-0.68) (0.26) (-0.49) (-0.61) (-0.41)  (-0.07) (-0.13) (0.02) (-1.80)* (-1.02) (-1.28) 
Number Firms Followed -0.029 -0.038 -0.024 -0.022 -0.020 -0.049  0.025 0.026 0.018 0.003 0.017 0.011 
(-3.33)*** (-3.72)*** (-1.58) (-2.13)** (-0.90) (-1.66)*  (2.44)** (2.28)** (1.06) (0.28) (0.75) (0.38) 
Concurrent Earnings Forecast 0.397 0.450 0.532 0.336 0.556 0.734  -1.160 -1.298 -0.873 -1.140 -1.160 -1.523 
(1.99)** (1.79)* (1.71)* (1.73)* (2.31)** (2.55)**  (-5.21)*** (-4.62)*** (-2.98)*** (-5.84)*** (-5.38)*** (-5.95)*** 
Pre-Earnings 0.324 0.497 0.034 0.083 -0.063 -0.280  0.846 0.786 0.698 0.457 -0.051 -0.638 
(1.00) (1.26) (0.08) (0.26) (-0.16) (-0.61)  (3.31)*** (2.51)** (1.67)* (1.58) (-0.14) (-1.52) 
Post-Earnings 0.301 0.226 0.631 0.180 0.276 0.288  -0.797 -0.700 -0.977 -0.766 -0.732 -0.692 
(1.24) (0.76) (1.79)* (0.81) (1.02) (0.94)  (-2.52)** (-1.84)* (-2.08)** (-2.53)** (-1.97)** (-1.53) 
Abs. Recommendation Change -0.031 -0.172 0.286 0.031 0.327 0.388  -0.463 -0.532 -0.484 -0.430 -0.792 -0.770 
(-0.25) (-1.13) (1.47) (0.25) (1.59) (1.68)*  (-2.72)*** (-2.55)** (-2.11)** (-2.89)*** (-2.76)*** (-2.19)** 
Prev1M -2.220 -2.487 -0.333 -2.345 -1.863 -0.817  -1.011 -1.212 0.711 -2.023 -1.426 0.638 
(-2.48)** (-2.25)** (-0.29) (-2.29)** (-1.49) (-0.52)  (-0.90) (-0.89) (0.56) (-1.70)* (-1.12) (0.44) 
Prev1Y -0.533 -0.398 -0.527 -1.018 -1.191 -1.441  1.353 1.878 1.005 0.504 0.883 0.527 
(-1.91)* (-1.22) (-1.14) (-2.38)** (-2.10)** (-2.17)**  (4.29)*** (4.81)*** (2.22)** (1.44) (1.95)* (0.98) 
Avgerage  Turnover -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.026  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003 
(-0.32) (-0.53) (-0.37) (-0.56) (-0.68) (-1.66)*  (2.04)** (1.97)** (1.97)** (5.86)*** (4.05)*** (8.39)*** 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-6.29)*** (-6.60)*** (-4.46)*** (-3.05)*** (-2.11)** (-2.41)**  (8.52)*** (8.44)*** (5.27)*** (-1.63) (-0.86) (-1.47) 
Book-to-Market -0.026 -0.059 -0.053 -0.494 -0.453 -0.622  0.031 0.129 0.085 -1.339 -1.709 -1.880 
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(-0.50) (-0.96) (-0.80) (-1.40) (-1.48) (-1.50)  (0.49) (1.60) (0.96) (-3.91)*** (-3.50)*** (-2.78)*** 
Analyst Coverage -0.013 -0.001 -0.009 -0.048 -0.067 -0.054  -0.010 -0.012 -0.009 -0.155 -0.229 -0.248 
(-1.31) (-0.12) (-0.76) (-2.43)** (-2.40)** (-1.67)*  (-0.77) (-0.80) (-0.69) (-6.00)*** (-5.86)*** (-5.14)*** 
       
 
      
Year Fixed Effects N N N Y Y Y  N N N Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects N N N Y Y N  N N N Y Y N 
Analyst Fixed Effects N N N N Y N  N N N N Y N 
Firm-analyst Fixed Effects N N N N N Y  N N N N N Y 
       
 
      
Observations 7,554 5,619 3,304 7,510 6,637 5,446  7,835 5,901 3,446 7,782 6,836 5,585 
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.06  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.20 0.22 0.15 
       
 
      
 
 
This table reports results of pooled cross-sectional OLS estimations for domestic cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following recommendation changes for firms cross-listed on NYSE, 
NASDAQ and AMEX as ADR Level II, ADR Level III or Ordinary Shares between 2003 and 2007. Local refers to a recommendation change issued by an analyst whose location is the same as the 
covered firm. Pure Local and Expatriate Local are the subsets of the Local category. Pure Local analysts work for local research firms, while Expatriate Local analysts work for research firms from 
foreign countries. U.S.-located is a subset of the Foreign category that refers to analysts who are located in the United States. Local vs U.S.-located is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the 
recommendation change is issued by a Local analyst and 0 if issued by an US-located analyst. Pure Local vs U.S.-located is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the recommendations change is issued 
by a Pure Local analyst and 0 if issued by an US-located analyst. Expatriate Local vs U.S.-located is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the recommendation change is issued by an Expatriate Local 
analyst and 0 if issued by an U.S.-located analyst. Variable descriptions of the control variables are provided in the main body of the paper. Domestic abnormal return is measured as the domestic 
return less the return on the national stock market index portfolio. Columns (1)-(6) show estimation results for recommendation upgrades and columns (7)-(12) show estimation results for 
recommendation downgrades. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors are 
clustered by analyst. 
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Table 6.  Cross-Sectional Regressions within Analyst Movers 
Panel A: All analysts that move locations to/from the U.S. 
 Upgrades  Downgrades 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Local vs U.S.-Located -1.075 -1.089 -2.190 -2.465  0.342 -0.524 -0.596 0.176 
(-2.90)*** (-1.67)* (-2.08)** (-2.24)**  (0.75) (-0.49) (-0.61) (0.16) 
Broker Size 0.075 -0.012 -0.339 -0.354  -0.086 -0.498 -0.925 -0.676 
(0.70) (-0.02) (-0.46) (-0.36)  (-0.59) (-0.92) (-1.70)* (-0.99) 
Broker Reputation 0.012 1.310 0.866 0.707  -0.245 -1.515 0.046 0.064 
(0.04) (1.99)** (1.06) (0.79)  (-0.59) (-1.17) (0.04) (0.04) 
Analyst General Experience 0.161 -0.012 -0.207 0.239  -0.148 -0.318 -0.140 0.110 
(3.01)*** (-0.01) (-0.25) (0.31)  (-1.89)* (-0.62) (-0.27) (0.22) 
Analyst Firm Experience -0.045 -0.003 0.100 -0.002  0.136 0.131 0.259 0.199 
(-0.71) (-0.02) (0.88) (-0.01)  (1.70)* (0.93) (1.68)* (1.19) 
Number Firms Followed -0.078 -0.190 -0.141 -0.154  -0.010 0.033 0.000 -0.021 
(-3.20)*** (-2.46)** (-1.84)* (-1.76)*  (-0.40) (0.55) (0.01) (-0.31) 
Concurrent Earnings Forecast 0.174 0.294 0.414 0.584  -0.659 -0.682 -0.950 -1.002 
(0.61) (0.86) (1.15) (1.58)  (-1.79)* (-1.54) (-2.23)** (-2.30)** 
Pre-Earnings -0.803 -1.013 -0.198 -0.182  0.544 -0.198 -0.606 -1.073 
(-1.24) (-1.25) (-0.24) (-0.20)  (1.03) (-0.31) (-0.89) (-1.54) 
Post-Earnings -0.426 -0.185 -0.580 -0.510  -1.082 -1.554 -1.632 -1.891 
(-1.17) (-0.42) (-1.22) (-0.96)  (-1.67)* (-2.19)** (-1.95)* (-2.04)** 
Abs. Recommendation Change -0.009 0.423 0.130 -0.085  0.249 0.803 1.093 1.174 
(-0.05) (1.71)* (0.38) (-0.23)  (1.03) (1.87)* (2.36)** (2.27)** 
Prev1M -1.160 -0.109 -2.320 -2.557  -1.896 -1.572 -2.444 -0.996 
(-0.75) (-0.06) (-1.02) (-1.10)  (-1.09) (-0.68) (-0.90) (-0.32) 
Prev1Y -1.689 -1.900 -3.281 -3.384  0.211 -0.289 -0.645 -0.597 
(-4.15)*** (-3.45)*** (-2.61)*** (-2.69)***  (0.52) (-0.51) (-0.81) (-0.71) 
Avgerage Turnover 0.143 0.200 0.400 0.537  0.042 -0.076 -0.196 -0.526 
(0.85) (0.91) (1.02) (1.45)  (0.62) (-0.35) (-0.58) (-1.27) 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-4.32)*** (-0.11) (-0.68) (-0.77)  (3.41)*** (0.37) (1.33) (0.51) 
Book-to-Market 0.021 -0.050 -0.233 -0.335  -0.074 -0.173 -0.829 -1.087 
(0.29) (-0.51) (-0.39) (-0.54)  (-1.01) (-2.23)** (-1.30) (-1.47) 
Analyst Coverage -0.028 -0.013 -0.054 -0.085  -0.024 -0.040 -0.262 -0.258 
(-1.83)* (-0.48) (-1.21) (-1.71)*  (-1.15) (-1.00) (-2.89)*** (-2.60)*** 
     
 
    
Year Fixed Effects N Y Y Y  N Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects N N Y N  N N Y N 
Analyst Fixed Effects N Y Y N  N Y Y N 
Firm-Analyst Fixed Effects N N N Y  N N N Y 
     
 
    
Observations 1,643 1,471 1,421 1,223  1,692 1,524 1,454 1,251 
Adj. R2 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07  0.01 0.16 0.17 0.19 
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Panel B: Analysts that move locations to/from the U.S. and move…           
…within the same broker 
Upgrade Downgrade 
 
 
Coeff. t-stat N Adj. R2 Coeff. t-stat N Adj. R2 
 Local vs U.S.-located 
-2.207 (-3.00)*** 912 0.06 -0.783 (-0.74) 918 0.16 
 
Firm-analyst fixed effects Y Y 
Broker fixed effects Y Y 
…to a different broker 
Upgrade Downgrade 
 
 
Coeff. t-stat N Adj. R2 Coeff. t-stat N Adj. R2 
 Local vs U.S.-located 
-4.350 (-2.52)** 324 0.08 2.222 (1.69)* 354 0.13 
 
Firm-analyst fixed effects Y Y 
Broker fixed effects Y         Y       
 
This table reports results of pooled cross-sectional OLS estimations for domestic cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following 
recommendation changes for firms cross-listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX as ADR Level II, ADR Level III or Ordinary Shares 
between 2003 and 2007. Local vs U.S.-located is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the recommendation change is issued by a Local analyst 
and 0 if issued by an U.S.-located analyst. Domestic abnormal returns are measured as the domestic return less the return on the national 
stock market index. Panel A shows results of OLS regressions within the subset of analysts that move locations from local to U.S.-located 
or from US-located to local. Variable descriptions are provided in the appendix. Columns (1)-(4) show estimation results for 
recommendation upgrades and columns (5)-(8) show estimation results for recommendation downgrades. Standard errors are clustered by 
analyst. Panel B shows results of OLS regressions within the subset of analysts that move locations from local to U.S.-located or from 
U.S.-located to local, and stay with the same brokerage firm (upper panel) or move to a different broker (lower panel). The regressions 
control for firm-analyst and broker fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. t-statistics 
are provided in parentheses. 
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Table 7.  Relative Timing of Local and U.S. Recommendation Changes  
Panel A: Contingency table 
    Follower   
 
 
  0 1 Total 
Lo
ca
l v
s 
U
.
S.
-
Lo
ca
te
d 
0 
      3,419         738        4,157  
16.57% 3.58% 20.15% 
1 
    13,653      2,820      16,473  
66.18% 13.67% 79.85% 
 
 
Total 
    17,072      3,558      20,630  
    82.75% 17.25% 100% 
Pearson χ2 = 0.9356,   Pr = 0.333 
 
 
Panel B: Cross-sectional and interaction effects 
  Upgrade   Downgrade 
  
(1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 
     
Local vs U.S.-located -2.692 -2.529 
 
-0.085 -0.078 
 
(-2.26)** (-2.05)** 
 
(-0.10) (-0.09) 
Follower 0.230 0.831 
 
-0.401 -0.329 
 
(0.87) (1.61) 
 
(-1.21) (-0.42) 
Local vs US-located × Follower 
 
-0.731 
 
 
-0.086 
 
 
(-1.23) 
 
 
(-0.10) 
Broker Size 0.028 0.040 
 
0.270 0.269 
(0.07) (0.09) 
 
(0.46) (0.46) 
Broker Reputation 1.144 1.148 
 
1.106 1.109 
(1.80)* (1.81)* 
 
(0.76) (0.76) 
Analyst General Experience 0.272 0.292 
 
-0.157 -0.157 
(0.41) (0.44) 
 
(-0.19) (-0.19) 
Analyst Firm Experience -0.039 -0.042 
 
-0.129 -0.129 
(-0.43) (-0.46) 
 
(-1.28) (-1.29) 
Number Firms Followed -0.049 -0.049 
 
0.011 0.011 
(-1.65)* (-1.65)* 
 
(0.37) (0.37) 
Concurrent Earnings Forecast 0.731 0.737 
 
-1.540 -1.540 
(2.53)** (2.55)** 
 
(-6.02)*** (-6.02)*** 
Pre-Earnings -0.280 -0.278 
 
-0.589 -0.590 
(-0.61) (-0.61) 
 
(-1.39) (-1.39) 
Post-Earnings 0.280 0.286 
 
-0.661 -0.662 
(0.91) (0.93) 
 
(-1.45) (-1.45) 
Abs. Recommendation Change 0.402 0.404 
 
-0.792 -0.792 
(1.73)* (1.74)* 
 
(-2.23)** (-2.23)** 
Prev1M -0.817 -0.806 
 
0.640 0.640 
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(-0.52) (-0.52) 
 
(0.44) (0.44) 
Prev1Y -1.443 -1.446 
 
0.517 0.518 
(-2.17)** (-2.17)** 
 
(0.97) (0.97) 
Avgerage Turnover -0.026 -0.025 
 
0.003 0.003 
(-1.66)* (-1.63) 
 
(8.60)*** (8.61)*** 
Size -0.000 -0.000 
 
-0.000 -0.000 
(-2.40)** (-2.42)** 
 
(-1.46) (-1.46) 
Book-to-Market -0.636 -0.662 
 
-1.893 -1.894 
(-1.53) (-1.60) 
 
(-2.80)*** (-2.80)*** 
Analyst Coverage -0.054 -0.054 
 
-0.249 -0.249 
(-1.68)* (-1.67)* 
 
(-5.14)*** (-5.14)*** 
 
     Year fixed effects Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Firm fixed effects N N 
 
N N 
Analyst fixed effects N N 
 
N N 
Firm-analyst fixed effects Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
     Observations 5,445 5,445 
 
5,584 5,584 
Adj. R2 0.06 0.06   0.15 0.15 
 
Panel A summarizes a contingency table between the indicator variables Local vs U.S.-Located and Follower. Local vs U.S.-Located is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the recommendation change is issued by a Local analyst and 0 if issued by an US-located analyst. Follower is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if an analyst’s recommendation change is in the same direction and by the same magnitude as a previous 
recommendation change from a different analyst for the same firm within a 30-day period. Analogously, Follower is equal to zero, if the 
recommendation change is different in magnitude or direction from a previous recommendation change for the same firm made by other 
analysts during the previous 30 day. Panel B shows the results of pooled cross-sectional OLS estimations for domestic cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) following recommendation changes for firms cross-listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX as ADR Level II, 
ADR Level III or Ordinary Shares between 2003 and 2007. Variable descriptions are provided in the appendix. Columns (1)-(2) show 
estimation results for recommendation upgrades and columns (3)-(4) show estimation results for recommendation downgrades. Standard 
errors are clustered by analyst. The regressions control for fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
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Table 8.  Analyst Specialization and the Information Value of Recommendation Changes  
Panel A: Contingency table 
  Country vs Sector Specialist 
 
 
  0 1 Total 
Lo
ca
l v
s 
U
.
S-
Lo
ca
te
d 
0 
      1,519         292        1,811  
15.47% 2.97% 18.45% 
1 
      3,038      4,967        8,005  
30.95% 50.60% 81.55% 
 
 
Total 
      4,557      5,259        9,816  
    46.42% 53.58% 100% 
Pearson χ2 = 1300.0,   Pr < 0.001 
 
 
Panel B: Cross-sectional and interaction effects 
  Upgrade   Downgrade 
  
(1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 
     
Local vs U.S.-located -3.541 -4.227 
 
-0.007 0.174 
 
(-2.66)*** (-3.43)*** 
 
(-0.00) (0.08) 
Country Specialist -1.917 -3.765 
 
0.423 0.825 
 
(-1.32) (-1.99)** 
 
(0.34) (0.40) 
Local vs U.S.-located x Country Specialist 
 
2.077 
  
-0.440 
  
(1.11) 
  
(-0.22) 
Broker Size 0.135 0.137 
 
1.818 1.817 
(0.21) (0.21) 
 
(1.31) (1.31) 
Broker Reputation 1.259 1.268 
 
2.489 2.480 
(0.99) (0.99) 
 
(1.49) (1.48) 
Analyst General Experience 2.642 2.613 
 
1.502 1.514 
(2.30)** (2.28)** 
 
(1.65)* (1.65) 
Analyst Firm Experience -0.017 -0.017 
 
-0.133 -0.134 
(-0.12) (-0.13) 
 
(-1.16) (-1.17) 
Number Firms Followed -0.071 -0.071 
 
0.026 0.025 
(-1.87)* (-1.87)* 
 
(0.73) (0.72) 
Concurrent Earnings Forecast 0.945 0.936 
 
-1.064 -1.063 
(2.57)** (2.55)** 
 
(-3.05)*** (-3.05)*** 
Pre-Earnings -2.126 -2.140 
 
-0.332 -0.329 
(-2.68)*** (-2.70)*** 
 
(-0.52) (-0.52) 
Post-Earnings -0.393 -0.403 
 
-0.866 -0.864 
(-0.82) (-0.84) 
 
(-1.35) (-1.35) 
Abs. Recommendation Change 0.157 0.161 
 
-0.833 -0.831 
(0.45) (0.46) 
 
(-1.62) (-1.62) 
Prev1M -4.330 -4.301 
 
0.787 0.795 
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(-2.46)** (-2.45)** 
 
(0.46) (0.46) 
Prev1Y -2.433 -2.403 
 
0.452 0.442 
(-2.25)** (-2.25)** 
 
(0.65) (0.63) 
Avgerage Turnover 0.041 0.034 
 
-0.190 -0.188 
(0.21) (0.18) 
 
(-0.72) (-0.71) 
Size -0.000 -0.000 
 
-0.000 -0.000 
(-0.61) (-0.63) 
 
(-1.68)* (-1.67)* 
Book-to-Market -1.384 -1.369 
 
-1.044 -1.058 
(-1.89)* (-1.87)* 
 
(-1.13) (-1.13) 
Analyst Coverage 0.011 0.013 
 
-0.217 -0.217 
(0.25) (0.29) 
 
(-3.22)*** (-3.23)*** 
 
     
Year fixed effects Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Firm fixed effects N N 
 
N N 
Analyst fixed effects N N 
 
N N 
Firm-analyst fixed effects Y Y 
 
Y Y 
   
 
  
Observations 2,460 2,460 
 
2,488 2,488 
Adj. R2 0.147 0.147   0.15 0.15 
 
Panel A summarizes a contingency table between the indicator variables Local vs U.S.-Located and Country Specialist. Local vs U.S.-
located is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the recommendation change is issued by a Local analyst and 0 if issued by an US-located analyst. 
Country Specialist is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the analyst is a country specialist, and zero if the analyst is a sector specialist. The 
measures for county and sector specialization are defined in the variable appendix. Panel B shows the results of pooled cross-sectional OLS 
estimations for domestic cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following recommendation changes for firms cross-listed on NYSE, 
NASDAQ and AMEX as ADR Level II, ADR Level III or Ordinary Shares between 2003 and 2007. Variable descriptions are provided in 
the appendix. Columns (1)-(2) show estimation results for recommendation upgrades and columns (3)-(4) show estimation results for 
recommendation downgrades. Standard errors are clustered by analyst. The regressions control for fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
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Table 9.  Cross-Sectional Regressions by Country Characteristics 
Upgrade Downgrade 
Local 
indicator 
Country 
characteristic 
Interaction effect 
(Local x country 
characteristic) 
Adj. R2 Local indicator 
Country 
characteristic 
Interaction effect 
(Local x country 
characteristic) 
Adj. R2 
Socio-economic environment 
Advanced 
economy -0.218 1.327 -0.897 0.02 0.392 -2.128 1.114 0.03 
(-0.73) (3.64)*** (-2.31)** (1.26) (-5.43)*** (2.51)** 
GDP per 
capita -0.735 0.236 -0.191 0.01 0.447 -2.062 1.430 0.03 
(-2.67)*** (0.56) (-0.44) (1.69)* (-4.36)*** (2.85)*** 
Cultural 
distance -1.266 -0.261 0.207 0.01 2.243 0.804 -0.510 0.03 
(-2.82)*** (-2.16)** (1.61) (4.32)*** (6.08)*** (-3.46)*** 
Legal & political environment 
Legal origin 
-1.173 -1.182 0.911 0.01 1.551 2.025 -1.135 0.03 
 
(-3.43)*** (-3.34)*** (2.41)** (3.93)*** (5.08)*** (-2.57)** 
Rule of law 
-0.379 0.653 -0.427 0.02 0.674 -1.034 0.458 0.03 
 
(-1.50) (3.78)*** (-2.25)** (2.36)** (-5.13)*** (1.98)** 
Voice & 
Accountability -0.615 0.526 -0.257 0.01 0.790 -1.418 0.491 0.03 
 
(-2.22)** (2.36)** (-1.03) (2.60)*** (-6.07)*** (1.74)* 
Political 
Stability -0.596 0.830 -0.463 0.02 0.629 -1.575 0.849 0.03 
 
(-2.79)*** (2.94)*** (-1.57) (2.66)*** (-4.94)*** (2.41)** 
Government 
Effectiveness -0.164 0.768 -0.510 0.02 0.445 -1.131 0.533 0.03 
(-0.56) (3.76)*** (-2.31)** (1.30) (-4.98)*** (2.06)** 
 
Regulatory & governance environment 
Regulatory 
quality -0.034 0.817 -0.666 0.01 0.345 -1.038 0.647 0.02 
 
(-0.11) (3.59)*** (-2.75)*** (0.96) (-3.90)*** (2.20)** 
Corruption 
Control -0.173 0.652 -0.501 0.02 0.515 -0.922 0.481 0.02 
 
(-0.62) (3.88)*** (-2.77)*** (1.70)* (-4.93)*** (2.27)** 
Anti-director 
rights -0.612 0.301 -0.244 0.01 0.265 -1.721 1.049 0.02 
 
(-1.22) (0.65) (-0.44) (0.35) (-3.73)*** (1.30) 
Anti-self-
dealing -0.794 0.102 -0.634 0.01 0.872 0.547 0.706 0.02 
(-3.19)*** (0.20) (-1.25) (3.14)*** (0.84) (1.13) 
 
Reporting & disclosure environment 
CIFAR 
-0.912 -0.918 0.552 0.01 0.878 0.577 0.556 0.02 
 
(-3.62)*** (-1.90)* (1.09) (3.13)*** (0.99) (0.89) 
Disclosure 
Requirements -0.276 1.057 -0.799 0.01 1.248 -0.490 -0.258 0.02 
 
(-0.82) (2.90)*** (-2.03)** (2.99)*** (-1.13) (-0.55) 
Reporting 
frequency -1.073 -0.606 0.200 0.01 0.054 0.319 0.511 0.02 
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(-1.60) (-1.77)* (0.54) (0.06) (0.75) (1.08) 
Big4 Auditors 
-0.649 0.405 -0.170 0.01 0.550 -1.515 0.442 0.03 
(-2.00)** (0.99) (-0.41) (1.76)* (-3.68)*** (1.00) 
Earnings 
quality 
 
Earnings 
management -1.015 -0.732 0.506 0.01 1.614 2.044 -1.302 0.03 
 
(-2.98)*** (-1.96)* (1.26) (4.12)*** (5.07)*** (-2.88)*** 
Timely bad 
news 
recognition -0.939 -0.300 0.169 0.01 1.156 0.200 -0.082 0.02 
(-3.19)*** (-1.86)* (0.93) (3.43)*** (1.01) (-0.36) 
 
This table reports results of pooled cross-sectional OLS estimations for domestic cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following 
recommendation changes for firms cross-listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX as ADR Level II, ADR Level III or Ordinary Shares 
between 2003 and 2007. Local vs U.S.-Located is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the recommendation change is issued by a Local analyst 
and 0 if issued by an U.S.-located analyst. The specific country characteristic is reported in the row headings. Domestic abnormal returns are 
measured as the domestic return less the return on the national stock market index. The table shows in each row the coefficient and t-statistic 
of each regression for our main indicator Local vs U.S.- Located, the particular country characteristic and their interaction effect. All other 
control variables and year fixed effects are suppressed for ease of exposition. Variables descriptions are provided in the appendix. Standard 
errors are clustered by analyst. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. t-statistics are provided in 
parentheses. 
 
